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Summary : 
Cooperation in larger group is often more difficult to explain then cooperation in pairs. 
For humans it has been proposed that punishment plays a major role in stabilising 
individual contributions to group success (‘public goods’) but that claim remains 
contentious. The aim of this thesis was to gain understanding of a system in which both 
punishment and public goods may exist, and which can be studied both in nature and with 
an experimental setup in the laboratory. The interactions between victim reef fishes and 
parasitic sabre–tooth blennies that bite mucus and scales off other fishes provided a 
suitable study system.  
In the first of three manuscripts I described the natural history of this peculiar host–
parasite complex. The blennies occupy small territories. Resident victim species that are 
constantly under threat of being bitten reacted aggressively to blenny attacks, while 
visiting species used their potential to escape further interactions by swimming off. 
Among residents, the probability of aggressive reactions to blenny attacks was negatively 
correlated to group size without dropping to zero. The latter results fitted a public goods 
scenario where benefits of acting decrease with increasing group size. In the second 
manuscript I could demonstrate that aggression by victims functions as punishment as it 
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reduced the probability of future attacks by a blenny. Furthermore, field observations 
revealed that punishment creates a public good in locally abundant species as it increased 
the probability that blennies switched to a different victim species. Nevertheless, 
punishment appeared to be self–serving rather than altruistic because lab experiments 
suggested that blenny preferentially target non–punishing individuals. The third 
manuscript focussed more specifically on the blennies’ foraging decision rules. Overall, I 
documented that blennies may attack at preferred locations, that they may prefer 
abundant hosts, and that they may focus on specific non–punishing individuals. However, 
there was huge variation between individuals with respect to the relative importance of 
these factors, including the probability of switching victim species between subsequent 
attacks irrespective of victim responses. This variation may locally undermine the 
effectiveness of punishment, and may also sometimes create competition between 
conspecifics instead of a public good.  
In conclusion, the study demonstrates the existence of self–serving punishment in a 
parasite–host system. Public goods may emerge as a by–product of self–serving 
punishment due to the parasite’s foraging decision rules, which typically select against 
non punishing ‘free–riders’. How the observed variation in blenny decision rules may 
evolve and how victims should evolve their optimal responses in return would ideally be 
addressed in evolutionary game theoretic modelling, amenable to further empirical 
testing. 
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General Introduction 
 
Helping behaviours have attracted the interest of evolutionary biologists ever since 
Darwin (1859) realised that such behaviours are not easy to reconcile with his theory of 
evolution through natural selection. In a world where all individuals should be competing 
for resources, any behaviour that increases the fitness of another should be selected 
against. Hamilton’s famous theory of kin selection explained how indirect fitness benefits 
can balance direct costs of helping (‘altruism’): if actor and recipient are related the 
benefit of helping to the recipient times the degree of relatedness to the helper has to be 
larger than the costs of helping (Hamilton 1964). However, there are many examples of 
helping between unrelated individuals or even between species. Altruistic individuals that 
help unrelated individuals without getting anything in return will always be under 
negative selection. Thus, the key problem in such interactions is how to ensure that 
helping will yield something in return, leading to mutual benefits (‘cooperation’).  
The problem that may arise in potentially cooperative interactions is best illustrated in the 
prisoner’s dilemma game. In this game there are two players playing against each other. 
Each player can either cooperate or defect. The combined payoff is highest if both 
players cooperate but the individual payoff for defecting is always higher than for 
cooperating, independently of the partner’s action (see table 1). Thus, cooperation is no 
solution to the game if it is played only once. Cooperation can only emerge if the game is 
played repeatedly between the two players because under these conditions cooperating 
can be seen as an investment that yields future benefits due to the partner cooperating in 
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response (‘positive reciprocity’; Trivers 1971, Axelrod & Hamilton 1981, Clutton–Brock 
& Parker 1995).  
Table 1 
 player 2 cooperates player 2 defects 
player 1 cooperates 3/3 0/5 
player 1 defects 5/0 1/1 
Payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma, bold: payoff for player 1 
 
Cooperation between two players 
Today there are many models that can explain cooperation between two players (Sachs et 
al. 2004, West et al. 2007, Bshary & Bergmüller 2008). Bshary & Bergmüller identified 
nine basic concepts based on four parameters. A first key distinction to be made is 
whether helping is self–serving (by–product mutualism, Brown 1983) or an investment. 
In the latter case one has to ask whether the benefits are due to a self–serving response 
(‘pseudoreciprocity’, Connor 1986) or due to return investments (‘reciprocity’). 
Furthermore, the benefits may be due to the recipient’s behaviour (‘direct’) or due to the 
action of a third party (indirect’), and one can distinguish cases where investments yield 
benefits due to rewards (‘positive’) from cases in which investments yield benefits due to 
the absence of negative responses (‘negative’). Further parameters need to be introduced 
to distinguish between more specific concepts. For example, for indirect forms of 
reciprocity one has to distinguish whether or not interactions take place in a 
communication network in which bystanders eavesdrop and extract valuable information 
for own future interactions with the observed individuals (McGregor 1993). If a 
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communication network exists, then bystanders can attribute an image score to observed 
individuals, which will increase with each helping act and decrease with each failure to 
help (Alexander 1987, Novak & Sigmund 1998). As long as individuals only help if the 
image score of the recipient is above a critical threshold then indirect reciprocity based on 
image scoring may evolve (Nowak & Sigmund 1998). In the absence of image scoring, a 
concept called generalised reciprocity (Hamilton & Taborsky 2005, Rutte & Taborsky 
2007, Pfeiffer et al. 2005) may explain indirect reciprocity. The decision rule is that as 
long as an individual receives help it will help whoever is in need. Overall, the many 
existing concepts for two–player interactions appear to have their real–life counterparts 
(Bshary & Bronstein 2011), and the main challenge for empiricists seems to be to 
evaluate which concept may fit their study system best. 
  
Cooperation between n players 
In contrast to the larger body of both theoretical and empirical studies on cooperation 
between two individuals, cooperation between n>2 players is less well understood. It has 
been realised early on that cheating may be easier in n–player games. Most famously, 
Hardin (1968) introduced the concept of the ‘tragedy of the commons’. The tragedy 
typically arises if the benefits of individual contributions to a public good are shared 
equally by everyone. Under such conditions, so–called ‘free–riders do best as they don’t 
invest in the public good but benefit from the contributions of others.  
 
Social dilemmas are typically studied with the classic public goods game: consider a 
situation where there are 10 players. Each one can pay between 0 and 20 € into a 
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communal wallet in each round. After each round, the total amount of money in the 
wallet is doubled and given in equal proportions to all players. Under these conditions, 
the highest total payoff is achieved if everybody contributes the full 20 €. If all players 
pay 20 €, they all get 40 €. However, the highest individual payoff is achieved if the 
individual defects. This is because for the 20 € it can contribute it would only receive 40 
€/10 players = 4 € back. Contributing is thus altruistic in the Hamilton sense (Hamilton 
1964): it reduces an individual’s lifetime success. As free–riders gain more than 
contributors, cooperation quickly breaks down whenever the game is played with 
humans, unless additional parameters are introduced (Fehr & Gächter 2002, Milinski et 
al. 2002).  
 
While the standard public goods game predicts that contributions to a public good should 
break down there is plenty of empirical evidence that humans cooperate between 
unrelated individuals on a large scale, including in highly risky situations such as 
warfare. Therefore, many studies on humans aimed at finding the underlying mechanisms 
that allow the puzzling existence of public goods in our species. These studies typically 
use an experimental setup in the laboratory where humans are supposed to play 
cooperation games (mainly public good games) using computers. This allows controlling 
for many factors that are not under control in real life situations using detailed 
instructions and information for the participants. It is e.g. possible to make decisions 
completely anonymous and to control the information that each participant can use. The 
payoff is set by the experimenter and effects of different payoff matrices can be studied.  
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Experiments showed that humans behave in such games more cooperatively than was 
expected based on the payoff matrices (Ostrom 1998, Fehr & Fischbacher 2003). In 
particular two mechanisms appear to stabilise contributions to public goods, namely 
punishment and gain of reputation. Punishment as defined by Clutton–Brock & Parker 
(1995) is an action that reduces the payoffs of both the actor and a recipient who failed to 
cooperate, with the function to make the recipient behave more cooperatively in the 
future. Given the option, humans readily invest into punishment of non–cooperative 
individuals even if they will not interact with these individuals in the future (Fehr & 
Gächter 2002, Rockenbach & Milinski 2006, Egas & Riedl 2008, Gächter et al. 2008). 
This led to the development of the cultural group selection concept (Boyd et al. 2003, 
Gintis et al. 2003), which states that strong competition between groups of early humans 
selected for socially learned traits that help to stabilize cooperation within these groups to 
increase group survival. Colleagues interested in the inclusive fitness framework 
‘translated’ the cultural group selection models and argued that these traits evolved when 
human groups consisted mainly of related individuals and that punishment of non–
cooperators was under positive selection due to indirect fitness benefits (Gardner & West 
2004, Lehmann et al. 2007). According to this view, punishment is a mechanism out of 
place in our globalized society. Clearly, if one accepts that people show their natural 
decision rules in the experiments and that the money they get in the experiments should 
translate into fitness correlates then punishment in one–off situations with all players 
being strangers is under negative selection. As punishment stimulates the punisher’s 
reward system in the brain (de Quervain et al. 2004) there is at least a proximate 
explanation why subjects cannot resist punishing even in one–off situations. 
 12 
Nevertheless, it remains largely unclear why humans use punishment in public goods 
games, and more recent studies demonstrate that punishment works only in some cultures 
but not in all (Gächter et al. 2010).  
 
In contrast to punishment, the gain of reputation through contributions to a public good 
seems to provide a straightforward functional explanation why people may benefit from 
contributions. A verbal argument by Alexander (1986) was formalised by various authors 
(Nowak & Sigmund 1998, Leimar & Hammerstein 2001, Lotem et al. 2003). Two main 
scenarios have emerged, namely indirect reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund 1998, Leimar & 
Hammerstein 2001) and indirect pseudoreciprocity, also called ‘social prestige’ (Zahavi 
1995, Roberts 1998, Lotem et al. 2003). In both cases, a basic condition is that 
interactions take place in a communication network in which bystanders eavesdrop on 
ongoing interactions (McGregor 1993). These bystanders evaluate the level of 
cooperation displayed by interacting partners and attribute a corresponding image score. 
The score is positive if help is given and negative if help is refused. In indirect 
reciprocity, it pays to help because third partners provide help in return (Nowak & 
Sigmund 1998, Leimar & Hammerstein 2001). Thus every single act is seen as a one–
sided investment. In indirect pseudoreciprocity it pays to help because this increases the 
chance of being chosen for a mutually beneficial interaction (Zahavi 1995, Roberts 1998, 
Lotem et al. 2003). Thus, bystanders gain foreseeable benefits from observing 
interactions by identifying profitable partners. Currently, evidence that the gain of 
reputation provides a mechanism to stabilise contributions to a public good is restricted to 
humans (Milinski et al. 2002, Semmann et al 2005). Humans are indeed very sensitive 
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even to subtle cues of being observed, as such cues significantly increase levels of 
cooperation in anonymous games (Haley & Fessler 2005, Bateson et al. 2006). 
 
While humans are particularly able to cooperate on a large scale with unrelated 
individuals, there are some potential cases of n–player cooperation in other animals. One 
possible explanation is the concept of group augmentation (Kokko et al. 2001) that has 
been developed to explain unconditional contributions of helpers to offspring feeding and 
care in cooperatively breeding species. The logic behind group augmentation is that 
larger groups out–compete smaller groups and that therefore behaviours that promote an 
increase in group size can be self–serving even if it benefits all other group members as 
well. The group augmentation concept can be seen as by–product mutualism and/or 
pseudoreciprocity (where the benefits that get returned are a by–product of self–serving 
acts of the recipient) with more than one recipient at the same time. The concept of group 
augmentation has been best applied to cooperatively breeding meerkats. In meerkats, 
Suricata suricatta, sentinels look for predators in exposed locations while other group 
members are feeding. It could be shown that this behaviour is condition dependent and 
that individuals only act as sentinels if they are satiated (Clutton–Brock et al. 1999). 
Under these conditions it is the best option for an individual to look for a predator, which 
is not possible while digging for food, and thereby maximise the survival of all group 
members. Also the concept of generalised reciprocity (Pfeiffer et al 2005) may in 
principle apply to n–player interactions if helping is given to several recipients 
simultaneously. This idea has not yet been applied to non human animals. 
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Current problems with the empirical evidence on n–player concepts 
The empirical problems differ between the studies on humans and non–human animals. 
In non–human animals, the key challenge is to properly measure payoffs. This is 
particularly true for species with a kin structured population as found in cooperatively 
breeding species. It is then difficult to distinguish between kin selection (indirect 
benefits) and group augmentation (direct benefits) as potential explanations for stable 
contributions to public goods. In the experiments on humans, high genetic relatedness can 
be excluded, while game structure and payoffs are determined by the experimenter. 
Despite these advantages, results are not always easy to interpret. Kümmerli et al (2010) 
criticize that often every deviation from the expected value of cooperation (zero 
cooperation in one–off interactions) in games on human cooperation is attributed to 
prosocial preferences without controlling for errors. Because of this they designed their 
experiment in a way that made 100 % cooperation the best option for every individual. 
The interesting part of this is that now both selfish interests and prosocial preferences 
should lead to 100 % cooperation. The experiment therefore can be seen as a control that 
was lacking in the experiments done before, where not contributing was the selfish 
option. Many of the subjects of this game did not fully cooperate even though their 
understanding of the setup was tested before. This demonstrates again that there is 
caution needed for the evolutionary interpretation of economic experiments on humans. 
The authors suggest that humans are reluctant to show extreme behaviour (100 % 
cooperation as well as 100 % defection) and this would also explain previous results of 
unexpectedly high cooperation without any need to assume highly developed prosocial 
preferences in humans. The authors also suggest that experimenters should analyze the 
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relative effect of factors such as punishment or repeated interactions on human levels of 
cooperation rather than to interpret the absolute values of one single experiment. 
 
Currently, the strongest disagreement in the literature on public goods is arguably the role 
of punishment in stabilizing contributions. Some studies found positive effects on 
cooperation (Rockenbach & Milinski 2006), others found that punishment can stabilize 
cooperation if it is effective and rather cheap (Egas & Riedl 2008) and others found 
negative effects of punishment: costly punishment can be negative not only for the 
punisher and the punished individual but even for the whole group (Dreber et al. 2008). 
Because these studies differ in many parameters such as group size, payoff structure and 
strategic options of the players it is difficult to draw general conclusions.  
What is clearly lacking are studies in a natural setting and complementary experiments to 
identify ecological parameters that allow the existence of a public good and to study the 
role of punishment under natural conditions.  
Given my interest in cooperation, public goods, punishment and the study of animal 
behaviour, an ideal study system should have the following features:  
- n–player interactions between unrelated individuals 
- the possibility to properly infer relative payoffs of possible behavioural actions 
- the occurrence of a behaviour that might constitute punishment 
- the possibility to study the animals in their natural environment 
- the possibility to design laboratory experiments that are explicitly based on 
hypotheses developed during field observations 
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The system of parasitic blennies and their interactions with reef fish victims appeared to 
be a suitable system in that it fulfilled all the requirements listed above. I therefore 
decided to study this system in detail for my PhD thesis.  
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Short introduction to the study system 
 
The two species of parasitic blennies:  
Plagiotremus rhinorhynchus and P. tapeinosoma 
 
 
Picture 1: P. tapeinosoma in its hiding place 
 
 
 
 
Scientific classification: 
 
Kingdom: Animalia 
Phylum: Chordata 
Subphylum: Vertebrata 
Infraphylum: Gnathostomata 
Superclass: Osteichthyes 
Class: Actinopterygii 
Order: Perciformes 
Family: Blenniidae 
Tribe: Nemophini 
Genus: Plagiotremus 
 
 
Figure 1: 
Large canines of P. rhinorhynchus and 
dense rows of incisors (white arrows). 
 
 
The two species of blennies studied, Plagiotremus rhinorhynchus and P. tapeinosoma, 
occur in the tropical Indo–West and Central Pacific and are found on coral reefs and clear 
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lagoons at depths from 1 m to 40 m. The two species are territorial and include into their 
territory a small hiding hole, normally an empty hole of a tube–worm (see picture1), 
perfectly fit for their elongated slim bodies. Members of the tribe “Nemophini” are also 
called “Fang–blennies” or “Sabre–tooth–blennies” because of their elongated canines 
(fig.1). These teeth are not used for foraging but for male–male fights and for defence 
(Smith–Vaniz 1976). Their dentary incisors are forming a dense row. The tips of these 
incisors are thin and wedge shaped, ideally suited to scrape off mucous and scales 
(Smith–Vanitz 1976). 
Both blenny species are lepidophagous (scale eating) parasites that attack other fish to 
forage. Usually they sneak up on their victims from behind and try to catch them unaware 
(Smith–Vaniz 1976, Johnson & Hull 2006). Their attacks are very opportunistic; fish that 
are distracted, e.g. by fights or mating, get attacked immediately. Normally the blennies 
stop their biting attempts as soon as they are noticed (if their victims turn around and/or 
show threat displays). One of the common names of P. tapeinosoma, “Hit and Run 
Blenny”, describes the typical feeding behaviour of both species that comprises a rapid 
attack followed by a quick retreat to safety (Johnson & Hull 2006). Blennies follow this 
scheme independently of the reaction of the victim. Only in less than 1 % of my 
observations was a victim bitten twice without any retreat of the blenny between bites. 
This usually happens to large fish where the blennies hide underneath their bellies, 
repeatedly scraping off tissue in a zigzag movement and darting into safety before the 
fleeing victims are too far away from the secure reef. 
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Picture 2: P. tapeinosoma in the laboratory 
 
The blennies feed on the mucus and scales of a large variety of fish species, including 
predatory species. We did not notice that they avoid any of the species that live in their 
territories. Only cave–living species or fish that hide during day were not attacked in their 
shelters. The size of their victims also varies greatly. The length of victims that were 
observed being attacked in this study ranges from 2–65 cm. That blennies also attack 
larger species is known by many divers. Divers often get attacked from behind (at their 
legs and fins) when they pass by a blenny (personal observations).  
 
One of the two species, P. rhinorhynchus, has attracted attention because it shows 
variation in colour, with one morph closely resembling juvenile cleaner wrasses, 
Labroides dimidiatus (Kuwamura 1981; Côté & Cheney 2004, 2007; Moland & Jones 
2004; Johnson & Hull 2006, picture 3). Both adult morphs show two brilliant pale blue 
stripes at the side of the body. The background colour of the non–mimetic form is orange 
or brownish; the mimetic form has a nearly black background colouration. In juvenile 
blennies the second blue stripe is not yet fully developed and this colour pattern is nearly 
identical to that of juvenile cleaner fish. The feeding efficiency of the blue and black 
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(imitating the juvenile cleaner) morph seems to be higher in close proximity of juvenile 
cleaners (Côté & Cheney 2004, Moland & Jones 2004), but it is not clear yet if the main 
function of this mimicry is “aggressive” and helps to attack unaware fish or if it prevents 
attacks from predators (Côté & Cheney 2007) or even adult cleaners (Johnson & Hull 
2006).  
 
Also the “orange” form is said to be mimetic at some places. In New Britain and in New 
Guinea and the Solomon islands adult P. rhinorhynchus mingling with shoals of anthias 
(Pseudanthias spec.) were observed to be nearly uniformly orange, displaying only very 
narrow blue stripes (Smith–Vaniz 1976), blending into the shoal. In our study areas we 
could not find this extreme orange colour morph, though we found several blue and black 
individuals (imitating cleaners), adults as well as juveniles. These individuals were 
excluded from our observations as we were not interested in this potentially confounding 
aspect. Studying non–mimetic forms we never observed reef fishes that behaved in a way 
that suggested that they confounded the blennies with cleaner wrasses. No fish showed 
the typical displays (e.g. performing a head stand) that they normally show inviting a 
cleaner for inspection, though other studies found such behaviour (Johnson & Hull 2006).  
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Picture 3: P. rhinorhynchus, left: non–mimetic morph;  
mimetic colouration: adult (middle, © Andy Lewis) and juvenile (right) 
 
P. tapeinosoma also has two stripes at the side of the body, but they are nearly white. 
Between the two stripes there is an irregular pattern of vertical brownish stripes. This 
species does not mimic cleaner wrasses, but at the Great Barrier reef they are known to 
swim with schools of small wrasses (Thalassoma amblycephalus) that show a 
superficially similar pattern. The resemblance is not very good but confers according to 
Smith–Vaniz (1976) a real advantage because prey fishes are less likely to notice the 
predator. In the Red Sea, where we did our observations, there is no species that 
resembles P. tapeinosoma in a way that would allow such mimicry. 
 
Picture 4: P. tapeinosoma in the Red Sea 
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The victims of sabre–tooth blennies 
As mentioned above, the blennies are very opportunistic foragers and seem to avoid few 
species if any. In studying blennies we therefore studied many different victim species in 
the field. In fact, the diversity offered a great opportunity to investigate in a first step how 
differences in size, local abundance, or home range size may affect victim responses to 
blennies. The same species that are attacked by blennies also interact with the cleaner 
wrasse Labroides dimidiatus (Bshary 2001). In that mutualism, the cleaners are visited in 
their small territories (‘cleaning stations’) by so–called ‘clients’ from which they remove 
ectoparasites (Randall 1958, Grutter 1999). Conflict arises because cleaners actually 
prefer client mucus over ectoparasites, where eating mucus constitutes cheating (Grutter 
& Bshary 2003). Detailed studies have shown that three client categories need to be 
distinguished, namely predatory clients, resident clients with small territories/home 
ranges that include only one cleaning station, and visiting clients with large 
territories/home ranges that include several cleaning stations (Bshary 2001). The three 
categories of clients differ in the way they could respond to cheating by cleaners: 
predators could try to eat the cleaner, residents punish with aggressive chasing, and 
visitors switch to a different station for their next inspection (Bshary 2010). Thus, a 
logical question for the blenny–victim interactions was whether species also differ in how 
they respond to biting, i.e. aggressively or with flight. Predatory species were excluded 
from the study, because they have the additional option to try to eat a blenny rather than 
just chasing it, which makes their actions difficult to compare with non–predatory 
victims. 
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The victim species that was studied in detail:  
Pseudanthias squamipinnis 
 
 
 
Picture 5: Shoal of P. squamipinnis in the Red Sea 
 
 
 
Scientific classification: 
Kingdom: Animalia  
Phylum: Chordata  
Subphylum: Vertebrata 
Infraphylum: Gnathostomata   
Superclass: Osteichthyes 
Class: Actinopterygii 
Order: Perciformes 
Family: Serranidae  
Tribe: Anthiinae 
Genus: Pseudanthias  
Species: P. squamipinnis 
 
 
 
Picture 6: P. squamipinnis females and P. 
tapeinosoma in the Red Sea 
Apart from the initial general data collection we decided to focus on one victim species 
for more specific questions, with the aim to obtain sufficient sample sizes to properly 
answer the questions for one species. As it turned out, female scalefin anthias, 
Pseudanthias squamipinnis, appeared to be the most suitable option. P. squamipinnis is a 
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sexual dimorphic, protogynous reef fish (individuals start as females and turn into males 
as soon as they are large enough to defend a harem) that occurs in the Indo Pacific in 
shoals of up to several thousand individuals. It is the most abundant species on our reef 
patches in the Red Sea. Females are more numerous than males and live in harems of 
about 5 females per male. Anthias feed in shoals on zooplankton that they find in the 
water column in front or above the corals, which provide them with hiding places. 
Anthias are residents on the reef patches (Bshary 2001) and turned out to be common 
victims of the two blenny species we observed.  
 
Picture 7: P. squamipinnis, female (orange, left) and male (purple, right). 
 
Due to pelagic eggs and larval stages, anthias individuals at one patch are not more 
closely related with each other than with individuals from neighbouring patches (Avise & 
Shapiro1986). This makes it possible to exclude kin selection as an explanation for any 
cooperative behaviour they might demonstrate among each other against the two blenny 
species. 
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Picture 8: Small reef patch with P. squamipinnis in the Red Sea 
 
Basic observations as a starting point for the PhD project 
Preliminary observations in the Red Sea made it obvious that the blennies are regularly 
aggressively chased by their victims. Several victim species were observed to turn 
towards the blenny and accelerate towards the parasite. This happened sometimes without 
obvious reasons, i.e. without the fish being bitten or approached by the parasite in a 
stealthy way from behind. Aggressive responses to bites were not ubiquitous, however. 
No response or fleeing were frequently observed alternatives. In addition, there seemed to 
be great variance between species with respect to the way they responded. Individuals of 
some species seemed to be invariably aggressive, while individuals of other species were 
sometimes aggressive, and for some yet other species we never observed any aggression 
towards a blenny. The preliminary observations hence suggested that several interesting 
questions can be addressed in this host–parasite community. 
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Specific research questions addressed in the thesis 
The thesis consists of three result manuscripts where the sequence follows a logical 
process: results presented in the first manuscript led to questions addressed in the second 
manuscript, which raised questions addressed in the third one. The starting point was to 
collect sufficient field observations on blenny–victim interactions to be able to properly 
describe the system. More specifically, we wanted to determine any variation between 
victim species with respect to the probability of behaving aggressively towards the 
blenny. Given that we observe variation we wanted to find out which ecological variables 
might correlate with levels of aggression. We focussed on victim size, local abundance, 
discrimination between resident and visitor (the blennies are residents), and territoriality.  
 
Key results from the field observations suggested that a) aggression towards the blenny 
may function as punishment by decreasing the probability of future attacks, and b) that 
willingness to behave aggressively may diminish with group size as would be predicted if 
aggression provides a public good (Bshary & Bshary 2010a). Therefore, we explicitly 
tested these possibilities in the second manuscript. We tested experimentally whether 
aggression increases the probability that the blenny attacks alternative victims, we 
observed in the field whether aggression may provide a public good in shoaling victim 
species by inducing blennies to switch to a different victim species, and we conducted 
more laboratory experiments to find a potential explanation why victims might obtain 
direct benefits from providing a public good (Bshary & Bshary 2010b). 
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The results from the second manuscript provided overall evidence that aggression 
towards blennies may constitute a self–serving punishment that provides a public good as 
a by–product. However, we noticed strong variation between individual blennies in how 
they responded to punishment. Therefore, we investigated individual variation 
systematically in the third manuscript, with a focus on the question how such variation 
may promote or hinder the occurrence of public goods in our system. 
 
In the general discussion that follows the three data chapter I will try to bring together the 
results of the three manuscripts for a bigger picture. First, I will conclude what we have 
learned about the blenny–host system. I will then discuss several important open 
questions about our system. While all of these questions should be studied in the future, I 
have tried to address several of them in vain during my PhD project. I will mention 
preliminary results and explain the methodological reasons why these questions are 
difficult to study. Finally, I will discuss how my results may help to explain more 
generally the conditions for the existence of public goods based on punishment. 
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Abstract 
The conditions under which humans benefit from contributing to a public good have 
attracted great interest; in particular the potential role of punishment of cheaters is 
hotly debated. In contrast, similar studies on other animals are lacking. In this study, 
we describe for the first time how the course of interactions between parasitic sabre–
tooth blennies (the cheaters) and their reef fish victims can be used to study both 
punishment and the emergence of public goods. Sabre tooth blennies (Plagiotremus 
sp.) sneak up from behind to bite off small pieces of scales and ⁄ or mucus from other 
fish. Victims regularly show spontaneous aggression as well as aggressive responses 
to blenny attacks. In a between species comparison, we tested how the probability of 
chasing a blenny is affected by (1) the option of avoiding interactions with a blenny 
by avoiding its small territory, and (2) variation in local abundance of conspecifics. 
We found that resident victim species are more aggressive towards blennies than 
visiting species. This difference persisted when we controlled for victim size and 
territoriality, suggesting that it is the enforced repeated game structure that causes 
residents to chase blennies. In residents, we also found a negative correlation between 
aggression towards blennies and local abundance, which suggests that the benefits of 
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chasing are diluted with increasing local abundance. We discuss the implication of 
these results for future studies. 
 
Introduction 
The existence of punishment where an individual decreases both its own and the 
target’s immediate payoffs (Clutton–Brock & Parker 1995) has been a key topic in the 
recent literature on human cooperation. Humans readily use the option to punish 
cheaters even in one–shot public good games (Fehr & Gächter 2002) or when they 
just observe transgressions (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004). In the experiments on humans 
such punishment creates a public good, because it causes punished individuals to 
behave more cooperatively in the future with other partners (Fehr & Gächter 2002). 
Based on these results, the cultural group selection concept (Boyd et al. 2003; Gintis 
et al. 2003) has been developed, which states that strong competition between human 
groups has selected for culturally transmitted punishment as a mechanism that 
benefits group survival. However, the notion that punishment increases group 
productivity has been contested (Rockenbach & Milinski 2006; Dreber et al. 2008; 
Egas & Riedl 2008). It seems that punishment can only be useful if it involves 
relatively low costs to the punisher and a high impact on the target (Egas & Riedl 
2008) and if the same partners have many interactions (Gächter et al. 2008).  
The evolution of punishment may be easier to understand in asymmetric games 
between two players where only one partner may cheat. For example, in cleaner fish–
client reef fish interactions, cleaners may cooperate by feeding on client ectoparasites 
and cheat by eating client mucus, whereas non–predatory clients lack the option to 
cheat cleaners (recent review by Bshary & Côté 2008). Some client species respond to 
cheating by cleaners with chasing, which causes cleaners to behave more 
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cooperatively during future interactions with the punishing individuals (Bshary & 
Grutter 2002, 2005). While the self–serving role of punishment has been 
demonstrated in the cleaner fish system, the effects of punishment on third party 
individuals have not been explored. For example, punished individuals could be 
generally more cooperative in future interactions. In that case, the punishing 
individual would not only gain personal benefits but in addition produce a public good. 
The scenario would then be similar to n–player cooperation games where the benefits 
resulting from a contribution are so high that individual contributions become 
immanently self–serving: per unit given the contributor receives more than one unit in 
return, independently of what others are doing. Such contributions to public goods 
could yield immediate benefits, in which case the concept of by–product mutualism 
(Brown 1983) applies. Alternatively, contributions could be self–serving even if they 
are an investment (in the sense that the immediate consequences are a reduction in 
payoffs for the actor, Bshary & Bergmüller 2008). Investment may yield foreseeable 
future benefits if recipients will use it for self–serving actions that benefit the investor 
as a by–product. To such circumstances, the concept of pseudoreciprocity (Connor 
1986) applies. An alternative term in the literature describing self–serving 
contributions to public goods is ‘weak altruism’ (Wilson 1990). 
From a strategic point of view, it is easy to understand that contributions to public 
goods are stable if the contributions are self–serving. However, it is important to 
identify the ecological conditions that cause helping to be self–serving and thereby 
causing the unconditional contributions (Nowak & May 1992; Van Baalen & Rand 
1998; Killingback et al. 1999; Kokko & Johnstone 1999; Taylor & Irwin 2000; Avilés 
2002). Of particular importance has been the concept of group augmentation (Kokko 
et al. 2001), which was developed to understand apparently unconditional helping in 
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cooperatively breeding species like meerkats Suricata suricatta (Clutton– Brock et al. 
1999, 2000; Clutton–Brock 2002). Mutual dependency between group members 
(Roberts 2005) causes conditions where helping can be either a by–product mutualism 
or pseudoreciprocity. Recently, Sherratt et al. (2009) developed a model where they 
assumed that an individual gets a disproportionate amount of the benefits derived 
from its own contribution. Such asymmetry greatly enhances stable contribution to a 
public good and may explain for example the production of extra–cellular substances 
in bacteria (Griffin et al. 2004; Dugatkin et al. 2005). Nevertheless, empirical studies 
on by–product public goods that explicitly test theoretical predictions and aim at 
identifying both ecological parameters and game structures are a clear lack. 
Here, we describe in detail the nature of interactions in a system that appears to 
provide a setting for detailed additional studies on punishment and the possible 
emergence of public goods as a by–product. Our study species are parasitic sabre–
tooth blennies, Plagiotremus rhinorhynchus and P. tapeinosoma, and their victim 
coral reef fish species. Sabre–tooth blennies defend small territories in which they 
attack many different types of fish species and bite off small chunks of skin, mucus 
and scales. This is their only way of gaining food (Smith–Vaniz 1976). Plagiotremus 
rhinorhynchus has attracted attention because it shows variation in colour, with one 
morph closely resembling juvenile cleaner wrasses (Kuwamura1981; Côté & Cheney 
2004, 2007; Moland & Jones 2004; Johnson & Hull 2006). To avoid possible effects 
of such aggressive mimicry on our results, we only included adult, non–mimetic 
blennies in our study. For our game theoretic approach, sabre-tooth blennies are the 
equivalent of ‘phenotypic defectors’ (Sherratt & Roberts 2001) or ‘always defect 
players’ (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981) in terminology used to evaluate the stability of 
cooperation. We noticed during preliminary observations that host fishes sometimes 
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show spontaneous aggression as well as aggressive responses to successful and 
attempted blenny attacks. Such aggression may serve as punishment sensu Clutton–
Brock & Parker (1995) because it may alter the target’s (blenny) future behaviour to 
the benefit of the punisher (the fish that was bitten). In contrast to a cooperative 
context, punishing in the blenny system cannot cause the target to behave more 
cooperatively in the future but punishment could be beneficial if it causes the blenny 
to attack other individuals.  
Victim species differ with respect to two parameters that could have important effects 
on game structure and hence the probability of aggressive responses. First, some 
victim species are resident within a blenny’s territory and hence experience an 
enforced repeated game structure: they could be at permanent risk of being bitten by 
the blenny. In contrast, visitor species have large home ranges and can in principle 
avoid a blenny by avoiding its territory. Second, local abundance varies greatly 
between species and sometimes also within species, ranging from one individual to 
hundreds. Both theory and experiments on humans propose that the efficiency of 
punishment relies on repeated interactions (Clutton–Brock & Parker 1995; Gächter et 
al. 2008). Therefore, we predicted that residents are more likely to respond 
aggressively to blennies than visitors. With respect to group size, we wanted to 
investigate whether aggression could be costly (i.e. reducing the direct fitness of the 
chaser) in larger groups. While the costs of chasing are presumably independent of 
group size, the benefits of chasing a blenny may well be reduced in larger groups: in 
larger groups it is more likely that a blenny will bite another group member if it 
decides to attack the same victim species again despite having been chased during its 
last encounter. Furthermore, if the blenny switches to a different victim species in 
response to victim aggression, all look–alikes (conspecifics) would benefit while only 
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the chasing individual incurs the cost of chasing. In this scenario, the chasing 
individual would produce a public good. If chasing does become costly in larger 
groups we predicted that victim aggression should be absent in large groups. In 
contrast, if chasing is inherently self–serving, we predicted an absence of or at best a 
weak negative correlation between local abundance of victims and chasing of the 
blenny. 
 
Methods 
Study Site 
All original data presented here were collected in September to November 2002 at 
Ras Mohammed National Park in Sinai, Egypt. The study site was at Mersa Bareika 
(27°47'20.5''N, 34°13'28.7''E), a bay that is well protected against surge. In this area, 
incoming sand through wadis led to the formation of patch reefs that are separated 
from each other by sand. Observations took place at 12 different reef patches. All of 
these reef patches were small (estimated size between 3.5 and 30 m3) and located in 
shallow water (depth between 1.5 and 9 m). 
. 
Study Species 
The two species of blennies studied, two Plagiotremus rhinorhynchus and 10 P. 
tapeinosoma, occur in the tropical Indo–West and Central Pacific and are found on 
coral reefs and lagoons at depths from 1 to 40 m. At most reef patches, only one 
blenny was present while at the two largest blocks several blennies were present but 
we could focus on one individual because of their territoriality. Both blenny species 
are lepidophagous (scale eating) parasites that attack other fish to forage. Usually they 
sneak up on their victims from behind and bite off small chunks of skin, mucous and 
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scales (Smith–Vaniz 1976; Johnson & Hull 2006). Normally they stop their biting 
attempts as soon as they are noticed (if their victims turn around, pers. obs.). One of 
the common names of P. tapeinosoma, ‘Hit and Run Blenny’, describes the typical 
feeding behaviour of both species that comprises a rapid attack followed by a quick 
retreat to safety (Johnson & Hull 2006). Blennies follow this scheme independently of 
the reaction of the victim. Only in less than 1 % of our observations was a victim 
bitten twice without any retreat of the blenny between bites.  
With respect to victim species, we obtained data on 32 non–predatory resident species 
(‘residents’) and on 29 non–predatory visiting species (‘visitors’), following the list of 
Bshary (2001). Resident species live permanently at the same reef patch, whereas 
visitors cross between reef patches and stay only for short periods at any one. The 
most abundant resident species Pseudanthias squamipinnis is sexually dimorphic. The 
data for males and females were used separately, increasing the n for residents to 33. 
We excluded predatory species because they have the additional option to try to eat a 
blenny rather than just chasing it, which makes their actions difficult to compare with 
non–predatory victims. In addition, we excluded non–predatory species that could not 
be classified clearly as either resident or visitor (‘facultative visitors’, see Bshary 
2001) to avoid any confounding effects of this ambiguity. 
 
Data Collection 
Observations were carried out using scuba equipment and sitting on the surrounding 
sand 2–3 m in front of a reef patch with a blenny present. Observations lasting 60 min 
were evenly spread over the day and no blenny was observed more than once on the 
same day. Each of the three observers visited each reef patch twice at different times 
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of day. Thus, a total of 6 h of observations are available for each blenny adding up to 
a total of 72 h of observations. 
All interactions between the blenny and another fish were first observed over the 
entire duration, and immediately afterwards, the following data was noted on a 
Plexiglas plate: 
1. Victim species. Species were determined according to Randall (1983). 
2. Length of victim. The total length of the individual was estimated to the nearest cm 
by comparison with a reference measuring stick. 
3. Sex of victim species (in sexually dimorphic species). 
4. Type of interaction: 
– unprovoked aggression by the ‘victim’; 
– biting attempt followed by a non–aggressive response of the victim’ 
– biting attempt followed by aggressive response of the victim; 
– bite followed by a non–aggressive response of the victim; 
– bite followed by aggressive response of the victim. 
Aggression by the victim was scored if it accelerated towards the blenny, usually 
evoking flight behaviour by the blenny. We scored ‘unprovoked aggression’ if a fish 
chased a blenny passing in front and hence not obviously intent on attacking the 
chaser. We scored a biting attempt if a blenny approached a fish from behind in a 
characteristic ‘stop and go’ manner, which also proceeds successful biting attempts 
(Smith–Vaniz 1976). We scored ‘aggressive response’ if the potential or real victim 
turned round and swam towards the blenny. A ‘non–aggressive response’ was scored 
if the potential or real victim swam away from the blenny or did not move at all. 
In separate dives, we counted the number of individuals per resident species on each 
reef patch. For up to 10 individuals, we counted exact numbers, while we used 5 unit 
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categories for up to 50 individuals and 10 unit categories for estimations of local 
abundance above 50 individuals. 
 
Data Analysis 
We ran separate analyses for ‘unprovoked aggression’, aggression in response to 
biting attempts, and aggression in response to biting. For analyses of unprovoked 
aggression, we calculated the percentage of apparently unprovoked chasing relative to 
all observed chasing events. For the other two forms of aggression, we calculated the 
percentage of aggressive responses to biting attempts as n aggressive responses ⁄ 
biting attempts * 100, and the percentage of aggressive responses to biting was 
calculated as n aggressive responses to biting ⁄ all bites * 100. Species values were 
obtained by first calculating for every type of aggression one mean value per species 
per reef patch. These values were used to calculate one mean value per species. The 
species values were then used to compare aggression between residents and visitors, 
and to correlate aggression with our median values of group size. 
Not all species were observed both in the ‘attempting to bite’ and ‘successful bite’ 
situations, which explains the variation in sample sizes between the analyses. 
For a within species correlation between group size and aggression, we focussed on 
the most abundant victim species, Pseudanthias squamipinnis. This species is 
sexually dimorphic so we had local abundance and aggression data for both males and 
females. For the analysis, we generated the category ‘general aggression’ as the 
percentage of aggressive behaviours by victims divided by all interactions in order to 
have a reasonable sample size. 
Finally, we ran a series of control analyses to explore the effects of potentially 
confounding variables like body size and territoriality. Visiting species are on average 
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larger than resident species (Bshary 2001), whereas resident species are more likely to 
be territorial. To control for size effects, we carried out one analysis in which we only 
considered species of 10–15 cm mean total length, and another analysis in which we 
calculated the correlation between body size and aggression in resident species only. 
To control for effects of territoriality, we identified the following ten resident species 
as non–territorial (typically shoaling) and asked how they would compare to visitor 
species with respect to aggression: Adioryx diadema, Myripristis murdjan, 
Pseudanthias squamipinnis, P. taeniatus, Chromis ternatensis, C. dimidiata, C. 
caerulea, Cheilodipterus lineatus, Neopomacentrus miryae and Amblyglyphidodon 
leucogaster. We did not run analyses that control for phylogeny. A phylogenetic tree 
that includes most victim species shows that while resident species and visitor species 
tend to group in clades, these clades are quite randomly distributed over the 
phylogeny and hence do not cause systematic errors (Bshary 2001). 
All data were analysed using SPSS 17.0 applying only non–parametric statistics. All 
p–values are two tailed. When we tested whether the parameter ‘resident ⁄ visitor’ and 
or the parameter ‘local abundance’ had any effect on the probability of aggression, we 
had three behaviours (unprovoked aggression, aggression in response to biting attempt, 
and aggression in response to bites) that could potentially yield significant results. We 
therefore had to adjust the alpha level with the sequential Bonferroni test (Rice 1989). 
In this method, the original a–level (0.05) is divided by n tests to be conducted to 
obtain the first a'. If one p–value is below the a' level, this result is accepted as 
significant and a new a'' is calculated by dividing 0.05 by n tests –1. This procedure is 
repeated until all p-values fail to be below the corresponding critical a–level, and are 
hence considered to be non–significant. 
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Results 
General Information 
In total, 1932 interactions between blennies and their victims from the 12 reef blocks 
were used in the analysis. In 1200 cases (62.11 %), the victim species showed 
aggressive behaviour. As victim behaviour towards the two P. rhinorhynchus 
individuals was within the range of values for P. tapeinosoma individuals we analysed 
the data without distinguishing between the blenny species. 
 
Comparison Between Residents and Visitors 
Resident species showed significantly more aggressive behaviour in all categories of 
interaction when the sequential Bonferroni technique was applied (Mann–Whitney U–
tests, initial a' = 0.017; unprovoked aggression: n residents = 33, n visitors = 29, z =  
–3.822, p < 0.001; aggression in response to biting attempts: n residents = 24,  
n visitors = 15, z = –3.408, p = 0.001; aggression in response to bites: n residents = 27, 
n visitors = 27, z = –4.686, p < 0.001, Fig. 1).
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Figure. 1:  
Comparison of occurrences of three types of aggressive behaviour  
(unprovoked aggression, aggression in response to biting attempts  
and aggression in response to bites) between resident and visiting  
victim species. Medians are represented with the 25 and 75 percentiles.  
Sample sizes per category for residents: 33, 24 and 27, respectively.  
Sample sizes for visitors: 29, 15 and 27, respectively. 
Resident victims show significantly higher levels of aggression in all 
three comparisons. 
 
 
Potentially Confounding Variables 
The differences in aggressive behaviour towards blennies between residents and 
visitors largely persisted when only species of similar sizes (10–15 cm) were 
considered for the analysis (U–tests, unprovoked aggression: n residents = 10,  
n visitors = 9, z = –1.870, p = 0.061, aggression in response to biting attempts:  
n residents = 8, n visitors = 5, z = –3.029, p = 0.002; aggression in response to bites:  
n residents = 7, n visitors = 8, z = –3.350, p = 0.001).  
In addition, there are consistent positive correlations between resident body size and 
aggressive behaviour although the correlation is not significant for unprovoked 
aggression (Spearman correlations, unprovoked: n = 33, rs: 0.234, p = 0,190; biting 
attempts: n = 24, rs: 0.595, p = 0.002; bites: n = 27, rs: 0.441, p = 0.021). 
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The differences between residents and visitors persisted when only the ten non–
territorial resident species were considered for the comparisons (U–tests, initial a' = 
0.017; unprovoked aggression: n residents = 10, n visitors = 29, z = '2.636, p = 0.008, 
aggression in response to biting attempts: n residents = 10, n visitors = 15, z = '2.237, 
p = 0.025 aggression in response to bites: n residents = 10, n visitors = 27, z = –3.545, 
p < 0.001). 
 
Density Dependence of Aggression in Resident Species 
In all three categories, the median abundance of species was negatively correlated 
with species aggression when the sequential Bonferroni technique was applied 
(Spearman correlations, initial a' = 0.017; unprovoked aggression: n = 33, rs = –0.397, 
p = 0.022; response to attempt: n = 24, rs = –0.491, p = 0.015; response to bite: n = 27, 
rs = –0.470, p = 0.013, Fig. 2a–c). 
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Figure. 2:  
Correlations between the resident species’ local abundance 
(median number of individuals at a patch) and aggression towards 
blennies. Each dot represents the mean value for one species.  
(a) Spontaneous aggression relative to all aggressive acts towards  
blennies (n = 33 species);  
(b) aggression in response to a blenny’s approach  (n = 24 species); 
(c) aggression in response to a blenny’s bite (n = 27 species).  
All correlations are significantly negative. 
 
Density Dependence of Aggression in Pseudanthias squamipinnis 
There were marginally significant negative correlations between group size and 
‘general aggression’ against blennies in both sexes (Spearman correlation, P. 
squamipinnis, a' = 0.025; females: n = 12, rs = –0.581, p = 0.047; males: n = 11, 
rs = –0.661, p = 0.027, Fig. 3). 
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Figure. 3: Correlation between local abundance and aggressive behaviours 
towards blennies in 11 male and 12 female Pseudanthias squamipinnis shoals. 
Each shoal is represented by one dot. The correlations are marginally  
significant at the 0.025 level (because of Bonferroni correction). 
 
 
Correlations Between the Three Measures of Aggression 
We only calculated correlations for resident species because of the absence of 
aggressive behaviour in visiting species. There was a significant positive correlation 
between the aggressive response to bites and to biting attempts (Spearman correlation, 
initial a) = 0.017, rs = 0.788, n = 22, p < 0.001). In contrast, unprovoked aggression 
showed no correlation with the other two types of aggression (Spearman correlations, 
unprovoked aggression vs. Aggression following attempts: rs = 0.172, n = 24,  
p = 0.422; unprovoked aggression vs. aggression following bites: rs = 0.186, n = 27,  
p = 0.352). A similar pattern emerged in the within species correlations for male 
Pseudanthias squamipinnis. There was a non–significant but very positive correlation 
between the aggressive response to bites and to biting attempts (Spearman correlation, 
rs = 0.731, n = 7, p = 0.062), while unprovoked aggression yielded non-significant but 
negative correlations with the other two types of aggression (Spearman correlations, 
unprovoked aggression vs. aggression following attempts: rs = –0.152, n = 8,  
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p = 0.719; unprovoked aggression vs. aggression following bites: rs = –0.317, n = 8,  
p = 0.444). In female P. squamipinnis all correlations between the three types of 
aggressive responses were far from being significant (Spearman correlations, 
aggression following biting attempts vs. aggressive response to bites: rs = 0.309,  
n = 11, p = 0.355, unprovoked aggression vs. aggression following attempts: rs = 
0.273, n = 11, p = 0.417; unprovoked aggression vs. aggression following bites:  
rs = –0.118, n = 11, p = 0.729). 
 
Discussion 
We asked two principal questions about the interactions between blennies and their 
victims. First, whether any variation between species’ probability to chase blennies 
can be explained by the distinction enforced repeated game structure, and visiting 
victims that can in principle avoid repeated interactions with a blenny. Second, 
whether the probability of victim aggression is linked to variation in the local 
abundance of species, where high abundance may cause aggression to become costly. 
Our results show that both parameters are important. 
 
Enforced Repeated Game Structure 
Resident species were consistently more likely than visitors to aggress blennies after 
being bitten, in response to an approach and without provocation. The differences 
between residents and visitors largely persisted when we controlled for size and 
territoriality. Visitors not only fled after an attack but typically left the reef patch 
(Bshary, A. & Bshary, R., pers. obs.). Thus, they effectively excluded the possibility 
of another interaction in the near future, an option that resident species lack. The 
results thus correspond very well to the behaviour of the same species during cleaning 
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interactions with the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus, where residents are likely 
to punish cleaners for taking bites of mucus [which Bshary (2001) defined as cheating 
behaviour] while visiting clients are likely to swim off instead (Bshary & Grutter 
2002; Bshary & Schäffer 2002). It could therefore be that the responses to cleaners 
and sabre–tooth blennies co–evolved or that the reactions to one are because of 
selection on the reaction to the other. This could be tested by exposing Caribbean 
fishes to sabre–tooth blennies. Caribbean fishes are not exposed to such parasites and 
they do not punish or switch cleaning station in interactions with cleaning gobies of 
the genus Elacatinus (Soares et al. 2008a) even although these gobies sometimes 
cheat as well (Soares et al. 2008b). With respect to the current study, we propose that 
an enforced repeated game structure caused the evolution of aggression towards 
blennies in resident species. This hypothesis should be tested in the future by testing 
whether aggression functions as punishment by reducing the probability of future 
attacks. Currently, it is clear that victim aggression does not yield immediate benefits 
as blennies very rarely bite twice in one attack (observed only 10 times in this study) 
but instead retreat immediately after one bite. Therefore, aggression is not necessary 
to make the blenny swim away. While there are currently few examples of 
punishment in animals other than humans, it has already been shown that the very 
same victim fish species use punishment successfully to increase service quality by 
cleaner wrasse (Bshary 2002; Bshary & Grutter 2005). 
Alternative explanations for the aggressive behaviour of residents seem to be unlikely: 
aggression cannot be a direct response to pain because if this was the case then both 
resident and visitor species should show aggressive behaviour after painful attacks. 
While smaller fish might find attacks more painful than large fish, we found that the 
difference between residents and visitors in reaction to bites persisted when we 
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controlled for size. We also found that larger residents tended to be more aggressive 
to blennies than small residents, while we would expect the opposite if aggression was 
a direct response to pain, since bites should be more painful to smaller fish. Also, 
aggression does not seem to be a by–product of territoriality as non–territorial resident 
species were still more aggressive towards blennies than visitors were.  
Despite the fact that visitors can avoid repeated interactions with blennies, it seems 
unlikely that they will never return again to a reef patch where they have been bitten. 
Thus, it appears that visitors as well as residents may experience several interactions 
with any blenny within their home ranges. Nevertheless, encounter rates with visitors 
for any particular blenny will be much lower than for the blenny’s resident victims. 
Long time intervals between subsequent interactions may impose cognitive 
constraints on both blenny and victim, turning their repeated interactions into 
functionally one–off interactions. Models of reciprocity and punishment demonstrate 
that remembering the partner’s last behaviour is essential for punishment to work 
(Clutton–Brock & Parker 1995). In contrast, punishment in one–off interactions or 
functionally one–off interactions may only work if kin selection between the victim 
and other potential victims is invoked (Gardner & West 2004). In the blenny–visitor 
case, relatives of the chasing victim would have to benefit from a temporarily reduced 
attack probability. However, such a scenario is unlikely to apply to reef fishes because 
pelagic egg and ⁄ or larval stages should prevent any kin structure in shoals, as 
demonstrated in Pseudanthias squamipinnis (Avise & Shapiro 1986). 
 
Local Abundance ⁄ Density Dependence 
The negative correlations of aggression with group size both on the inter–specific and 
the intra–specific level can be interpreted in two ways. First, with increasing group 
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size each individual experiences less pressure from the blenny and hence the potential 
benefits of chasing diminish with increasing group size. In this scenario, the decision 
to chase or not is unaffected by its consequences on the fitness of conspecifics. 
Second, it could be that aggression by victims causes blennies to switch to other 
victim species for future attacks. In that case, chasing would produce a public good to 
all look–alikes. As group size increases, the personal benefits for the chasing 
individual would be reduced while the costs remain constant, and chasing would 
hence become less likely in larger groups. To distinguish between the two potential 
explanations, future studies that focus on the foraging strategies of the blennies are 
necessary. 
An interesting result was that high levels of aggression were maintained in species 
that occurred in high densities of around 40–60 individuals per reef patch. This result 
provides evidence against the possibility that reef fish face a basic tragedy of the 
commons problem (Hardin 1968) when chasing a blenny. In the basic tragedy of the 
commons scenario, contributions to a public good are invariably under negative 
selection for such large group sizes unless additional parameters are included, such as 
strong between–group competition (Boyd et al. 2003; Gintis et al. 2003) or the 
possibility of gaining social prestige which is useful in other situations (Nowak & 
Sigmund 1998; Milinski et al. 2002). Our results fit with a scenario where a 
contributor gets a higher share of the benefits it generates than other group members 
(Sherratt et al. 2009). Indeed, individuals may gain an extra personal benefit from 
chasing a blenny in two possible and not mutually exclusive ways. First, aggression 
leads to the blenny attacking elsewhere in the future. This potential benefit would 
require a degree of site fidelity of the victim at least over short time periods. Second, 
aggression makes the blenny focus on other individuals. This would require individual 
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recognition of potential victims by the blenny. Evidence for individual recognition is 
widespread for fishes (Griffiths & Ward 2006) and includes individual recognition of 
members of other species (Tebbich et al. 2002), but individual recognition in blennies 
has yet to be tested. 
 
Correlation Between the Three Forms of Aggression 
Unprovoked aggression is not correlated to the other two types of aggression, with 
some of the correlation coefficients even yielding negative tendencies. We explored 
some potentially confounding factors such as territoriality and hiding in crevices and 
found no influence of these (results not shown). We do not know in what way 
unprovoked aggressive behaviour is different from aggression towards a stalking or 
biting blenny. As all three forms of aggression are similarly correlated with an 
enforced repeated game structure and with local abundance one would expect a 
common cause. In the absence of indications explaining why unprovoked aggression 
is different, future studies should keep the separation between the various situations of 
aggression towards blennies. 
 
Conclusions and Outlook 
Our results provide evidence that enforced repeated game structure is necessary for 
the evolution of aggression towards a cheater, although the benefits of such 
aggression remain to be evaluated. In addition, blenny–victim interactions provide a 
setting in which the effect of the number of partners on the level of aggression 
towards a shared enemy can be studied. The observation that even members of large 
groups chase blennies with about 50 % probability is interesting because the result 
suggests that the putative benefits of punishment are not dissolved in large groups, 
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while public goods may potentially emerge in this setting. As a next step, two 
important hypotheses have to be tested: that aggression towards a blenny functions as 
punishment and that punishment in larger groups constitutes a public good. 
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Summary 
A key challenge for evolutionary biologists is to determine conditions under which 
individuals benefit from a contribution to public goods [1, 2]. For humans, it has been 
observed that punishment of free riders may promote contributions [3, 4], but the 
conditions that lead to stable cooperation based on punishment remain hotly debated 
[5–8]. Here we present empirical evidence that public goods may emerge as a by–
product of self–serving punishment in interactions between coral reef fishes and 
parasitic saber–tooth blennies that stealthily attack their fish victims from behind to 
take a bite [9]. We first show that chasing the blenny functions as punishment [10], 
because it decreases the probability of future attacks. We then provide evidence that 
in female scalefin anthias, a shoaling species, punishment creates a public good 
because it increases the probability that the parasite switches to another species for the 
next attack. A final experiment suggests that punishment is nevertheless self–serving 
because blennies appear to be able to discriminate between look–alike punishers and 
nonpunishers. Thus, individuals that do (not*) contribute to the public good may risk 
being identified by the parasite as easy targets for future attacks. 
*: is missing in the original publication 
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Results and Discussion  
Cooperation in groups is difficult to explain because individual contributions are 
shared among group members, a condition that is often vulnerable to free riding [1, 2]. 
Free riders benefit from the contribution of others but do not contribute themselves, 
and they therefore gain higher payoffs than contributors do. Two main solutions have 
emerged in studies on humans. First, contributions to public goods can be stable if 
players may gain a positive reputation from contributing, which increases the 
probability of receiving help in other situations [11–13]. Second, humans may achieve 
stable cooperation in n–player games if players are allowed to punish cheaters [4]. 
Empirical evidence for the success of punishment even in one–off interactions has led 
to a heated theoretical discussion about which conditions such punishment may 
evolve from. Models of ‘‘cultural group selection’’ [5, 6] propose that fast social 
learning within groups stabilizes punishment against the problem of so–called 
second–order free riding (contributing to public goods but failing to pay for the 
punishment of free riders). Others have pointed out that punishment in one–shot 
games can only evolve as a result of indirect fitness benefits [7, 8]. For a better 
understanding of the conditions that lead to stable punishment, it seems to be of 
paramount importance to identify more natural conditions in which punishment 
occurs and to identify the consequences of punishment on an individual’s fitness. For 
example, under natural conditions it seems more likely that individuals interact 
repeatedly. Repeated interactions may create conditions in which, at least in theory, 
individuals may gain direct benefits from punishment, even if it creates a public good. 
The empirical evidence from experiments on humans is mixed in the sense that in 
some studies, punishing individuals gain more money than the average nonpunishing 
individual, whereas other studies find the opposite [14–19]. The cited studies differ 
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from each other with respect to many parameters such as group size, information 
about the behavior of others, payoff structure, strategic options, and ethnic 
membership, making it difficult to draw general conclusions. Here we explore the 
possibility that punishment yields direct benefits in an animal system in which field 
observations suggest that the likelihood of punishment depends on both a repeated 
game structure and group size [9]. In our study system, saber–tooth blennies stealthily 
attack other reef fish species from behind to take a bite of mucus, scales, and/or tissue 
[20]. The blennies occupy small territories, and resident victim species that repeatedly 
interact with the same blenny often chase blennies in response to bites [9]. In contrast, 
visiting species that may simply swim beyond a blenny’s range typically never chase 
blennies but swim off [9], suggesting that an enforced repeated game structure is 
essential for the emergence of residents chasing blennies. We tested first whether 
chasing a blenny functions as punishment sensu Clutton–Brock and Parker [10]: the 
immediate reduction in payoffs due to the costs of chasing the blenny might be offset 
by the blenny seeking alternative victims in the future. If that was the case, we asked 
what the consequences of punishment on the parasite’s behavior might be if the 
punisher was a member of a shoaling species. Many resident victim species live in 
aggregations, raising the question of whether conspecifics may also benefit from the 
chasing done by a group member. This would be the case if punishment increases the 
probability that a blenny switches to a different victim species for its future attacks. 
We addressed this question on one particular shoaling resident species, scalefin 
anthias Pseudanthias squamipinnis. Individuals of this species frequently chase 
blennies [9], an observation that cannot be explained with kin selection as a potential 
mechanism because it has been demonstrated that anthias groups lack any kin 
structure [21]. Therefore, punishment has to increase the direct fitness of punishers 
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even in this shoaling species. One possible explanation is that blennies select for 
stable punishment because they discriminate between lookalikes, where one 
individual punishes and another one does not. We tested this hypothesis 
experimentally.  
Does Aggression Function as Punishment? 
To test whether aggression reduces the probability of being selected again as a victim, 
we let 18 blennies feed off of two differently colored Plexiglas plates: one was 
invariably retrieved in response to the blenny taking a bite, whereas the other one 
invariably chased the blenny in response to taking a bite. After training, three naive 
persons presented independently of each other both plates simultaneously to the 
blenny at equal distance and scored what the blenny chose, without any further 
chasing. Blennies attacked the fleeing plate significantly more often than the chasing 
plate, no matter whether the chasing had been done by hand or in a more standardized 
way with a machine (sign test: handheld plate: n = 8 individuals, x = 0, p = 0.008; 
machine used to standardize chasing: n = 10 individuals, x = 1, p = 0.02). These data 
demonstrate that chasing may function as punishment: the apparent reduction in 
immediate payoffs of both actor (through energetic expenditure) and recipient 
(through energetic expenditure and risk of injury) yields future benefits to the actor, 
because the act alters future behavior of the recipient. In our case, the blenny will 
preferentially seek other victims. Clear demonstrations of punishment have hitherto 
been rare in animals (but see [22–24]) because it is often difficult to exclude the fact 
that immediate benefits drive the behavior. In our case, aggression does not yield 
immediate benefits because blennies almost always bite only once during an attack 
and retreat even without any reaction of their victim [9]. 
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Does Punishment Create a Public Good in Locally Abundant Species? 
To test whether chasing the blenny can create a public good in shoaling fishes, we 
observed 17 blennies in the field. We concentrated our observations on the females of 
a locally abundant species, scalefin anthias, P. squamipinnis, to get a sufficient 
amount of data of one species. We compared the percentage of the blennies switching 
to another species if they were aggressively chased with the percentage of switching 
without any aggressive response of the victim. Overall, chasing the blenny increased 
the probability that it switched to another species for its next attack both in a detailed 
sample on one blenny (X2 test, n = 256 interactions following a female anthias–
blenny interaction, X2 = 9.2, df = 1, p = 0.0024, Figure 1) and when we compared 
mean switching probabilities of several blennies after being aggressed and after not 
being aggressed by a female anthias (Wilcoxon signed ranks test, n = 17 blennies,  
z = 22.059, p = 0.039, Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Punishment Creates a Public Good 
The probabilities that blennies switch to another victim species for their next attack,  
depending on whether a female anthias chased or did not chase the blenny in the  
previous interaction. 
Black: data on one blenny studied in detail for 16 hr. 
White: data on 17 blennies, median and interquartiles of individual mean values. 
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These data suggest that all members of a shoal of lookalikes profit from the chasing 
done by an individual fish. Punishment by one individual thus appears to create a 
public good in shoaling species. In line with this assessment, a between–species 
comparison revealed a slightly negative correlation between local abundance and 
likelihood of chasing saber–tooth blennies [9]. Nevertheless, the creation of a public 
good does not lead to a breakdown of punishment, neither in scalefin anthias nor in 
other resident aggregating species [9]. Therefore, the question arises of what factors 
may cause that punishment to remain self–serving, even if it additionally creates a 
public good. One possibility is that the punisher gets a larger proportion of the 
benefits than other group members [25]. This logic has been proposed in the 
framework of ‘‘group augmentation’’ [26]. This concept proposes that individuals 
may benefit from helping other group members because their own reproductive 
success is linked to the survival of these group members. The concept was developed 
to explain apparently unconditional individual contributions to vigilance and pup 
feeding in meercats [27, 28]. Indeed, individuals contribute most to group benefitting 
activities when they are satiated, and they therefore benefit disproportionately from 
activities other than foraging. More generally, it has been noted that both by–product 
mutualism [29], in which an individual shows a self–serving behavior that benefits 
others as a by–product, and pseudoreciprocity [30], in which an individual’s 
investment causes self–serving responses that benefit the investor as a by–product, 
may explain cooperation in situations in which more than one individual benefits from 
helping [31, 32]. 
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Could Blenny Foraging Decisions Select for Stable Punishment Even in Large 
Groups? 
In a laboratory experiment, we tested whether blennies are able to identify free riders. 
We used four plates (see Figure S1A available online) to present look–alike pairs 
(mimicking conspecifics) and a different–looking individual (mimicking an 
allospecific) in a counterbalanced design across individual blennies. Each blenny was 
confronted with a 100 % punishing plate, a look–alike 0 % punishing ‘‘free riding’’ 
plate, and a different–looking plate that punished a foraging bite of the blenny with 
50 % probability. In each trial, two plates were presented simultaneously, and the 
blenny was allowed to take a single bite. Depending on its choice, this would either 
lead to a punishment action followed by removal of both plates or to immediate 
removal of both plates. The three possible combinations in which two plates could be 
presented pairwise were counterbalanced across trials. Our construction, to which the 
lever of the plate was attached, allowed a standardized movement of the plate of fixed 
direction and distance to punish a blenny (Figure S1B). Under these conditions, 
blennies generally preferred the nonpunishing plate over its look–alike 100 % 
punishing plate (Wilcoxon signed rank test, n = 8, Z = 22.38, p = 0.017). Three out of 
eight blennies met our learning criteria for a significant preference to attack the 
nonpunishing plate when presented together with the 100 % punishing look–alike 
plate within a maximum of 80 joint presentations (Figure 2). In addition, we found 
that blennies generally preferred the two look–alike plates over the different–looking 
plate. They significantly preferred the nonpunishing plate over the 50 % punishing 
plate (Wilcoxon signed rank test, n = 8, Z = 22.52, p = 0.012, Figure 3), and there was 
a nonsignificant tendency that the blennies preferred the 100 % punishing plate over 
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the 50 % punishing plate (Wilcoxon signed rank test, n = 8, Z = 21.82 p = 0.069, 
Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Blennies May Discriminate between Punishers and Free Riders 
The probabilities for eight blennies to take a bite from the nonpunishing  
plate when paired with the look–alike 100 % punishing plate over a maximum  
of eight series of ten trials each. 
Bold lines: individual blennies that fulfilled our criteria for significant preference  
for the nonpunishing plate. 
Dashed line: expected value if blennies do not discriminate between plates.  
For the experimental setup of experiment 2, see also Figure S1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Blennies Prefer Abundant Victim Types 
The percentages with which blennies took a bite from the plate that punished  
with 50 % probability when presented with a different–looking plate that either  
punished with 0 % probability or with 100 % probability.  
Median and interquartiles of mean values for eight different blennies are presented. 
Dashed line: expected value if blennies do not discriminate between plates. 
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The results demonstrate that at least some blennies may be able to learn to 
discriminate between punishers and nonpunishers and then selectively bite 
nonpunishers. Their foraging decision rules would then select against nonpunishing 
individuals and hence select against free riders. In addition, the results suggest that 
blennies generally prefer more–abundant victim types over rarer ones. In this respect, 
the blennies act like many predators: it is textbook knowledge that predators may 
select prey disproportionately to its abundance either because predators develop 
search images or because they prefer to frequent the habitat of abundant prey species 
[33]. The blennies’ preference for abundant victim types could strongly interfere with 
their willingness to switch from frequently punishing but abundant species to rarely 
punishing species that occur at low densities. Nevertheless, we note that there are far 
more individual fish in the reef than the number of plates we used in our experiment. 
Thus, the challenge blennies face under natural conditions appears to be more 
cognitively demanding. On the other hand, it might still be easier for a blenny to 
distinguish between fish than between plates. In addition, in nature, blennies could 
simply stay close to a nonpunishing individual for repeated attacks and thereby select 
against free riders, whereas such a blenny strategy was excluded in our experiment 
because the plates were removed after each attack. 
In summary, our various results demonstrate that aggression by victims functions as 
punishment because it increases the probability that saber–tooth blennies select 
alternative victims during future attacks. In this respect, our experiments in which we 
used Plexiglas plates seem to corroborate well with our field observations. 
Punishment is likely to produce a public good in shoaling species because blennies are 
likely to switch to other victim species. In our victim study species, there is no kin 
structure [21] that could explain why individuals punish, though they provide a public 
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good [7, 8]. More generally, kin structures will rarely exist in reef fish species, 
because the vast majority of them are open–water spawners with pelagic egg and 
larval stages, which creates a mixed population structure [34, 35]. Therefore, direct 
benefits of the observed punishment are needed to explain the persistence of the 
public good. The reason why contributions to the public good appear to be self–
serving is that the common enemy selects for the contribution in our system. Free 
riders risk being identified as easy targets for future attacks by the blenny, and 
avoiding this risk may compensate for the costs of chasing, thereby selecting against 
free riding. Strictly speaking, contributions to the public good are therefore not a case 
of cooperation, because individuals are selected to punish completely independently 
of the positive effects their behavior might have on conspecifics [31]. Nevertheless, 
by–product effects may be important starting points for the evolution of more 
sophisticated helping behaviors [36]. Our study system differs in a key factor from 
standard game theoretic experiments on human groups: in each round, the blenny (the 
cheater) only interacts with a single individual of its own choice, whereas in many 
human experiments, all group members interact simultaneously [3, 4, 14, 16–18, 37]. 
As a consequence, it is always clear which individual of a shoal has to punish the 
blenny for its cheating. A victim cannot expect others to do the punishment, because 
they did not have a negative experience. We think that such conditions often apply to 
humans as well, in which punishment is a selfserving response to being cheated while 
benefiting the community as well. A person whose house gets broken into or who gets 
attacked by robbers will have to take action (call the police/fight back) even though 
all the neighbors may profit from this. This self–serving scenario might explain why 
humans ‘‘erroneously’’ punish free riders in a public goods game in which, in each 
round, a single individual is randomly selected to obtain the opportunity to punish 
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other group members, even though punishment is costly, because group composition 
changes every round [38] 
 
Supplemental Information 
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures and one 
figure and can be found with this article online at doi:10.1016/j.cub. 2010.10.027. 
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Supplemental Data 
 
Supplemental experimental procedures 
A) Field data 
Study site 
Field data were collected in May 2005, May 2006 and June 2007 at Ras Mohammed 
National Park in Sinai, Egypt. The study site was at Mersa Bareika (27°47'20.5'' N, 
34°13'28.7'' E). In this area, incoming sand through wadis led to the formation of 
patch reefs which are separated from each other by sand. Observations took place at 
20 small reef patches (estimated size between 3.5 m³ and 30 m³) located in shallow 
water (bottom depth between 1.5 and 6 m). 
 
Study species 
The two blenny species studied, Plagiotremus rhinorhynchus and P. tapeinosoma, 
occur in the tropical Indo–West and Central Pacific and occupy small territories. Both 
blenny species are lepidophagous (scale eating) parasites that attack other fish to 
forage. Usually they sneak up on their victims from behind and bite off small chunks 
of skin, mucus and scales [1–3]. 
 
For the victims we focused on female scalefin anthias Pseudanthias squamipinnis. P. 
squamipinnis is a sexual dimorphic, protogynous reef fish that occurs in the Indo 
Pacific in shoals of up to several thousand individuals. It is one of the most abundant 
species on our reef patches. Females are more numerous than males and they are 
common victims of the two blenny species we observed. Anthias individuals at one 
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patch are not more closely related with each other than with individuals from 
neighboring patches [4].  
 
Data collection 
Observations were carried out using scuba equipment and sitting on the surrounding 
sand 2-3 m in front of the reef patch. One observation session lasted 60 minutes. In 
2005, we studied one blenny in detail for 16 hours. In 2006, we studied eleven 
blennies for 2–4 hours each, while in 2007 eight blennies were observed for 5–8 hours. 
Variation in observation duration was due to blennies disappearing and/or spending 
much time in their hiding holes during single sessions. A total of 95 hours of 
observations is available. We choose reef patches that showed a high abundance of P. 
squamipinnis females to get a large sample size of interactions with this species. 
 
All interactions between the blenny and another fish were first observed over the 
entire duration, and, immediately afterwards, the following data was noted on a 
Plexiglas plate: 
1. Category of victim species: Pseudanthias squamipinnis female or other 
2. Type of interaction between blenny and female anthias victims: 
 – unprovoked aggression by the “victim”  
– biting attempt followed by a non–aggressive response of the victim 
 – biting attempt followed by aggressive response of the victim  
 – bite followed by a non–aggressive response of the victim 
 – bite followed by aggressive response of the victim 
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Aggression by the victim was scored if it accelerated towards the blenny, usually 
evoking flight behavior by the blenny. We scored ‘unprovoked aggression’ if a fish 
chased a blenny passing in front and hence not obviously intent on attacking the 
chaser. We scored a biting attempt if a blenny approached a fish from behind in a 
characteristic ‘stop and go’ manner, which also proceeds successful biting attempts 
[1,2]. We scored ‘aggressive response’ if the potential or real victim turned round and 
swam towards the blenny. A ‘non aggressive response’ was scored if the potential or 
real victim swam away from the blenny or did not move at all.  
 
Data analysis 
From the sequence of interactions between the blennies and their victim species we 
extracted all interactions with female anthias and looked at follow-up interactions. We 
scored whether female anthias had been aggressive or not, and whether the next attack 
of a blenny was directed at a female anthias or not. As we could not recognize 
individual female anthias we could not determine if the blenny bit the same individual 
or a different one. Whenever the blenny spent time in its hole we ignored the previous 
interaction. We thus had for each blenny one probability of switching victim species 
after being aggressed by female anthias, and one probability of switching victim 
species without being aggressed by female anthias. These data were used to test the 
effect of aggression. At three reef patches we observed no non–aggressive interaction 
between the blenny and female anthias. These patches had to be excluded from the 
analysis. For the other blennies, the number of observations following an interaction 
with an aggressive female anthias varied between 8 and 171 (median: 29), and the 
number of observations following an interaction with a non aggressive female anthias 
varied between 2 and 85 (median: 5). 
 82 
 
B) Experimental data in the laboratory 
Experiments were conducted at the Lizard Island Research Station, Great Barrier Reef, 
Australia. Subjects were caught in the surrounding reefs and released at the site of 
capture after the experiments. We only used Plagiotremus rhinorhynchus as subjects 
because they are easier to catch than P. tapeinosoma. Individuals were caught by first 
harassing them to a point where they would hide in their little hole. Then, we placed a 
hand–net above the hole and sprayed a clove oil solution directly into the hole. The 
blennies then either fled directly into the hand–net or drifted anaesthetized into the net. 
Individuals were then put in sealed plastic bags and returned to the station.  
 
The fish were kept individually in opaque aquaria sized 39x30x30 cm. Each aquarium 
contained a small tube (plastic or bamboo) attached to corral rubble that the fish used 
as hiding place. After one day of acclimatization we started holding tweezers with 
mashed prawn flesh in front of the entrance of the tube 3 times per day. All fish fed 
after a maximum of six days. In a second step the blennies learned to feed from a 
small plastic plate (3 x 2 cm) covered with mashed prawn, again held in front of their 
tube. Learning took 1 to 5 days of exposure. Once individuals fed reliably off the plate 
they were ready for the experiments.  
 
Experiment 1: does victim aggression function as punishment? 
Data were collected in July/August 2004, 2005 and 2006, testing in total 18 blennies. 
The blennies were confronted repeatedly with two new plates that differed in color 
and “behavior” from each other. One plate was removed from the tank (“fleeing”) 
after being attacked by the blenny while the other plate reacted with a short movement 
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towards the blenny (“chasing”). The role of the two plates (fleeing or chasing) was 
counterbalanced across blennies. The plates were offered away from the hiding place 
to allow some movement of the plates and the blenny. In the first year (2004) the 
aggressive movement was performed manually using a hand–held lever, where the 
experimenter made the plate chase after the blenny over about 10 cm. In the following 
years the movement was standardized by using a machine that caused a fixed saltatory 
response by the plate, 5.5 cm towards the blenny. We analyzed the speed of the 
movement with a frame by frame evaluation of a video, using Ulead VideoStudio 8. 
The 5.5 cm were completed from one frame to the next, hence in ≤ 4/100s. 
 
Initially, only one plate was offered at any given feeding event. Every feeding session 
consisted of several feeding events where the plates were offered in random order and 
was terminated when the fish was saturated and/or did not attack the plates any more. 
This phase lasted 6–7 days, after which the experiment followed. In the experiment, a 
naïve person offered both plates simultaneously at equal distance to the blenny and 
noted which plate was attacked. Every blenny was tested 3 times in total by 3 
different persons.  
 
We noted how often each blenny attacked the chasing/fleeing plate for matched pair 
comparisons. We conducted separate analyses for hand–held chasing and for 
standardized chasing. 
 
Experiment 2: Do blenny foraging rules select against free–riding? 
Data were collected in July 2009, testing 8 blennies. Each blenny was offered three 
plates in total, each 2 x 1.2 cm in size. Two plates looked very similar to each other 
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and the other one showed a different color and pattern (Fig. S1a). Of the two look–
alikes one plate always reacted to attacks with a chasing movement (“punishing”) 
while the other one was always removed from the tank after being attacked (“fleeing”). 
The differently looking plate showed both reactions with a probability of 50 %, using 
sequences where the same response could maximally occur three times in a row and 
that were counterbalanced over units of 10 trials. The three plates were presented pair 
wise in all three possible combinations in a counterbalanced way across trials and 
blennies. All plates were attached to a wooden construction that allowed only a 
standardized 8 cm covering movement of the plate when pushed by hand (Figure S1b). 
The two plates were 5.5 cm apart. Both plate types were used four times for the look–
alike plate type and four times for the differently looking single plate. 
 
Blennies experienced two sessions per day. In each session, we tried to obtain 30 data 
points but this was rarely possible because the blennies often lost interest. Five 
blennies soon stopped entirely to feed off the plates. In our analyses we only consider 
the eight individuals that interacted at least 100 times with the plates. We stopped 
experiments after a maximum of 240 trials, which means that we had a maximum of 
80 trials for each combination of two plates. 
 
For the analyses we calculated for each plate combination and units of 10 trials the 
percentage of trials in which the blenny ate from the less aggressive plate (0 % 
aggression versus 50 % aggression, 0 % versus 100 %, and 50 % versus 100 %). We 
tested whether blennies showed significant discrimination between each combination 
of plates. Our criteria for discrimination were either once 9 or 10 out of 10 trials, or 
twice 8 out of 10 trials, or three times at least 7 out of 10 trials. If an individual 
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reached the criterion for the discrimination between the 0 % aggression and the look–
alike 100 % aggression plate we stopped the experiment. 
 
Most statistical tests were calculated using SPSS version 17.0. X² tests were 
performed using the free internet service of Preacher [5]. 
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Figure S1 
a 
 
b 
 
 
Figure S1: Experimental setup for experiment 2.  
S1a: a picture of the plates, each 2 x 1.2 cm in size. Each blenny was tested with  
one pair of look–alikes and one plate with the alternative colors and design.  
The combinations were counterbalanced between blennies. S1b: Lateral view of the 
construction used for standardized punishment. Lever duplicated to show the  
amplitude of movement. 
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Abstract 
In its beginnings evolutionary game theory typically predicted that optimal behaviour 
in a given situation is uniform or bimodal. However, the growing evidence that 
animals behave more variably while individuals may differ consistently in their 
behaviour, has led to the development of models that predict a distribution of 
strategies. Here we support the importance of such models by providing evidence that 
punishment may have variable effects on targets in a coral reef fish host–parasite 
system. Parasitic blennies (Plagiotremus spec.) regularly attack other fishes to bite off 
scales and mucus. Individuals of some species react to being bitten with punishing the 
parasite through aggressive chasing. Such punishment can create a public good in 
shoaling species as it typically increases the probability that the parasite attacks other 
species. However, our field observations and laboratory experiments show that 
individual blennies differ markedly in how they incorporate being punished into their 
foraging decisions. Differences like this may have profound effects on the payoff 
structure and hence on the maintenance of the public good in this system. 
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Introduction 
Cooperation in groups that consist of more than two unrelated individuals has 
attracted considerable research interest. A major reason for this interest is that humans 
seem to be much more able to cooperate in large groups of unrelated individuals than 
other species (Fehr & Fischbacher 2003, Gintis et al. 2003, Boyd et al. 2003), raising 
questions about potentially unique selective pressures and/or cognitive or 
psychological mechanisms present in humans.  
 
A key problem for achieving cooperation in larger groups is typically illustrated with 
the standard public goods game. In this game each group member may contribute to a 
communal wallet. Contributions create additional value, which in the game is 
achieved by the experimenter matching contributions. After each round the group’s 
gains are equally split between group members, irrespective of how much each 
individual contributed. These rules typically lead to a situation where it is in the group 
interest that everybody contributes while for individuals contributions are altruistic. 
As a consequence, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that humans fail to cooperate 
in this game.  
 
However, variants of the public goods game may allow cooperative solutions. For 
example, individuals may benefit from contributing to a public good if this raises their 
image score and hence increases the probability of receiving help in other contexts 
(Milinski et al. 2002). Also, if human players have the option to punish free–riders 
(non contributing individuals) then stable cooperation may be achieved (Fehr & 
Gächter 2002), even though large cultural differences exist (Henrich et al. 2006, 
Gächter et al 2008, 2010). Most importantly, it has been argued that cooperative 
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behaviour in n–player interactions may readily emerge if some assumptions of the 
standard public goods game are relaxed. For example, the assumption of a linear 
relationship between the amount of contribution and the size of the public good is 
rarely fulfilled in reality (Archetti 2009a). If one assumes a sigmoid or step function, 
contributions are no longer altruistic but contributions and free–riding are under 
negative frequency dependent selection (Archetti 2009 a, b, 2001; Archetti & 
Scheuring 2010). Stable contributions to a public good may also emerge if individuals 
gain disproportionally from their own contributions (Sherratt et al. 2009). For 
example, bacteria gain disproportionally from their own extra–cellular compounds 
due to their spatial proximity (examples in West et al. 2007).   
 
Recently, the idea that individuals gaining disproportionate benefits from own 
contributions leads to stable contributions to public goods has been applied to a host–
parasite system involving reef fishes and parasitic scale eating blennies of the genus 
Plagiotremus. Reef fish regularly get attacked by parasitic blennies (Plagiotremus 
spec.) and many species react to this with chasing the parasite (Bshary &Bshary 
2010a). This chasing functions as punishment sensu Clutton–Brock & Parker (1995) 
as the momentary costs yield future benefits: chasing decreases the probability that 
the chasing individual gets attacked in the future (Bshary & Bshary 2010b). In 
shoaling species this self–serving punishment can additionally create a public good, as 
the parasites are more likely to avoid members of the group for the next attack if they 
were chased by one individual (Bshary & Bshary 2010b). As the probability of 
punishment correlates slightly negatively with group size (Bshary & Bshary 2010a) 
the relation between group size and public good seems to follow a non linear benefit 
function (Archetti 2009a,b; Raihani & Bshary 2011). 
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The emergence of a public good due to self–serving contributions depends critically 
on the foraging decision rules of the blenny. While Bshary & Bshary (2010b) found a 
significantly increased probability that blennies switch victim species in response to 
individual punishment, there appeared to be quite some variance in the field data. In 
the past such variance was often ignored as game theoretic models typically predicted 
uniform or bimodal evolutionarily stable strategies (Maynard Smith 1982). However, 
there is a growing literature that demonstrates considerable and often persistent 
variation between individuals (Sih et al. 2004, Bergmüller et al. 2010), and theoretical 
models demonstrate that such variation may be adaptive (McNamara et al. 2004, Wolf 
et al. 2007, Wolf et al. 2011). Most examples are on animal personality but of 
particular interest to our study are observations that individual predators or 
ectoparasites of one species may specialize on different victim species and/or hunting 
strategies. For example, individual leopards may specialise on either antelopes or 
monkeys (Hoppe–Dominique 1984), and individual scale eating cichlids specialize on 
attacking their victims from either the left or the right side (Hori 1993, Nshombo 
1994).  
 
The aim of the current paper was to study the foraging decision rules of sabre–tooth 
blennies with a special emphasis on the question whether there is individual variation 
in blenny foraging strategies and if so how that would affect the effectiveness of 
punishment and the emergence of a public good. We were particularly interested in 
two parameters: the importance of location for an attack and the probability of 
switching between victim species as a function of victim response. In a first step we 
reanalyzed the data of Bshary & Bshary (2010b) to test whether individual blennies 
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differ significantly with respect to the probability that they switch victim species after 
being aggressed in interactions with a highly abundant victim species, the females of 
scalefin anthias, Pseudanthias squamipinnis. We further analysed whether the 
probability of switching after punishment correlates with the importance female 
anthias have in the blenny’s diet and/or with the probability that female anthias punish. 
As a second step we performed experiments in the laboratory to investigate the 
foraging decision rules of individual blennies. We offered blennies simultaneously 
two small plates covered with mashed prawn. The plates could look quite similar or 
very different. In the first three experiments neither plate would respond to a blenny 
taking a bite with aggression (‘no punishment’) which allows us to explore 
spontaneous preferences. With the following questions we explored preferences for a 
location and/or an individual in attacks and if the blennies need to keep an individual 
in sight in order to be able to attack it repeatedly: a) If each plate remains in the same 
spot and in sight, will blennies bite at random or will they focus on one particular 
victim? b) If plate positions are counterbalanced and plates are out of sight between 
trials, will blennies bite at random or will they focus on one particular victim or will 
they focus on one location?  
In a third experiment we confronted blennies with three plates that were presented 
pair–wise in all possible combinations and in randomized positions. Two plates 
looked very similar to each other while the third plate looked very different. All three 
plates punished with 50 % probability. In such a set–up there is nothing to learn for a 
blenny. We asked whether blennies would nevertheless show spontaneous adjustment 
in current choices based on their experience in the previous trial. More specifically we 
asked whether punishment would affect the likelihood to switch to another location, to 
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another individual/plate or to take a bite. Our observations in the field suggested that 
punishment can have different effects in different individuals. 
 
In all experiments we asked whether blennies show general decision rules or whether 
individuals differed significantly in their decisions. Finally we will discuss how our 
findings relate to the idea that punishment of blennies by victims constitutes a self–
serving contribution to a public good in a shoaling reef fish species.  
 
Methods 
A) Field data 
Study site 
Field data were collected in May 2005, May 2006 and June 2007 in the Red Sea, at 
Ras Mohammed National Park in Sinai, Egypt. The study site was at Mersa Bareika 
(27°47'20.5'' N, 34°13'28.7'' E). In this area, incoming sand through wadis led to the 
formation of patch reefs which are separated from each other by sand. Observations 
took place at 20 small reef patches (estimated size between 3.5 m³ and 30 m³) located 
in shallow water (bottom depth between 1.5 and 6 m). 
 
Study species 
The two blenny species studied, Plagiotremus rhinorhynchus and P. tapeinosoma, 
occur in the tropical Indo–West and Central Pacific and occupy small territories. Both 
blenny species are lepidophagous (scale eating) parasites that attack other fish to 
forage. Usually they sneak up on their victims from behind and bite off small chunks 
of skin, mucus and scales (Smith–Vaniz 1976, Johnson & Hull 2006, Bshary & 
Bshary 2010a). 
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For the victims we focussed on female scalefin anthias, Pseudanthias squamipinnis, 
which is a sexually dimorphic, protogynous reef fish occurring in the Indo Pacific in 
groups of up to several thousand individuals. It is one of the most abundant species on 
our study reef patches. Females are more numerous than males and they are common 
victims of the two blenny species we observed. Anthias individuals at one patch are 
not more closely related with each other than with individuals from neighbouring 
patches (Avise & Shapiro 1986). This excludes the possibility that any cooperation we 
observed is due to kin selection. 
 
Data collection 
Observations were carried out using scuba equipment and sitting on the surrounding 
sand 2–3 m in front of the reef patch. One observation session lasted 60 minutes. In 
total 20 blennies were observed. In 2005, we studied one blenny in detail for 16 hours. 
In 2006, we studied eleven blennies for 2–4 hours each, while in 2007 eight blennies 
were observed for 5–8 hours each. Variation in observation duration was due to 
blennies disappearing and/or spending much time in their hiding holes during single 
sessions. A total of 95 hours of observations were recorded. We choose reef patches 
that showed a high abundance of P. squamipinnis females (between 50 and 150 
individuals) to get a large sample size of interactions with this species. 
 
All interactions between the blenny and another fish were continuously observed over 
the entire observation period, and, immediately after the observation, the following 
data was noted on a Plexiglas plate: 
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1. Category of victim species: Pseudanthias squamipinnis female or other 
2. Type of interaction between blenny and female anthias victims: 
 – unprovoked aggression by the “victim”  
– biting attempt followed by a non–aggressive response of the victim 
– biting attempt followed by aggressive response of the victim  
 – bite followed by a non–aggressive response of the victim 
 – bite followed by aggressive response of the victim 
 
Aggression by the victim was scored if it accelerated towards the blenny, usually 
evoking flight behaviour by the blenny. We scored ‘unprovoked aggression’ if a fish 
chased a blenny passing in front and hence not obviously intending to attack the 
chaser. We scored a biting attempt if a blenny approached a fish from behind in a 
characteristic ‘stop and go’ manner, which usually proceeds successful biting attempts 
(Smith–Vaniz 1976, Johnson & Hull 2006). We scored ‘aggressive response’ if the 
potential or real victim turned round and swam towards the blenny. A ‘non–
aggressive response’ was scored if the potential or real victim swam away from the 
blenny or did not move at all.  
 
Data analysis 
Effect of punishment 
From the sequence of interactions between the blennies and their victim species we 
extracted all interactions with female anthias and scored the follow–up interactions. 
We scored whether female anthias had been aggressive or not, and whether the next 
attack of a blenny was directed at a female anthias or not. Because a time delay could 
degrade the effectiveness of aggression we ignored the previous interaction if the 
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blenny had spent time in its hole. We thus had for each blenny one probability of 
switching victim species after being aggressed by female anthias, and one probability 
of switching victim species without being aggressed by female anthias. These data 
had been used previously to demonstrate that aggression increases the probability that 
a blenny switches to a different victim species for its next attack.  
Here we asked how important female anthias were for the diet of our blennies and 
whether or not individual blennies responded with similar switching probability to 
aggression.  
 
More specifically we calculated for every blenny the percentage of anthias chosen as 
victims in two ways: as percentage of anthias approached for attack and bitten of all 
approaches and bites observed in all species (approaches and bites of anthias/all 
approaches and bites x 100) as well as in a more restrictive way as percentage of bites 
on anthias in relation to all bites on all species observed (bites of anthias/all bites x 
100). The effect of punishment was calculated only for the six blennies where we 
observed at least 50 aggressive responses by female anthias as the percentage of 
switching after aggression minus the percentage of switching after no aggression. 50 
data points were selected as criterion on the basis that we wanted to avoid a) low 
expected values in our chi square test, b) low power of finding a significant difference 
if it exists due to small sample size, and c) overall high variance in the data 
(probability of the blenny switching to another victim species) due to small sample 
size. Note that be reducing the number of blennies included in our test we reduced the 
probability of finding significant differences between any two individuals. Thus, any 
significant result would be robust while in case of a lack of significant results our 
omission of individuals would have to be discussed.  
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B) Experimental data in the laboratory 
Experiments were conducted in August 2006 and July 2009 in the Indo Pacific, at the 
Lizard Island Research Station, Great Barrier Reef, Australia. Subjects were caught in 
the surrounding reefs and released at the site of capture after the experiments. We 
only used Plagiotremus rhinorhynchus as subjects because they are easier to catch 
than P. tapeinosoma. Individuals were caught by first harassing them to a point where 
they would hide in their little hole. Then, we placed a hand–net above the hole and 
sprayed a clove oil solution directly into the hole. The blennies then either fled 
directly into the hand–net or drifted anaesthetised into the net. Individuals were then 
put in sealed plastic bags and returned to the station.  
 
The fish were kept individually in opaque aquaria sized 39x30x30 cm. Each aquarium 
contained a small tube (plastic or bamboo) attached to corral rubble that the fish used 
as hiding place. After one day of acclimatisation we started holding tweezers with 
mashed prawn flesh in front of the entrance of the tube 3 times per day. All fish fed 
after a maximum of six days. In a second step the blennies learned to feed from a 
small plastic plate (3 x 2 cm) covered with mashed prawn, again held in front of their 
tube. Learning took 1 to 5 days of exposure. Once individuals fed reliably off the plate 
they were ready for the experiments.  
 
We performed three experiments in the laboratory. Data of the first two experiments 
were collected in July 2009, testing 8 blennies, all in the same order. Data of the 3rd 
experiment were collected in August 2006, testing 3 blennies. For all experiments we 
used Plexiglas plates (Size: 2.0 x 1.2 cm) that were attached to a lever and could be 
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attached to a wooden construction that allowed a movement of a standardized 
amplitude when pushed by hand. The two plates were 5.5 cm apart (figure1). The 
plates varied in their coloration and patterns. For every experiment each blenny was 
presented a different sub–set of plates and no plate was presented to the same blenny 
in more than one experiment. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Figure 1: Tank with the construction that was used in the experiments in the laboratory.  
By pulling a lever towards self until it hit the wooden block the experimenter could cause  
a standardised punishment action of the attached food–containing plates. 
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Experiment 1:  
Choice of target in a setup without punishment: Targets in fixed positions and 
always in sight. 
We presented the free swimming blenny two similar looking plates in fixed positions 
that did not react to the feeding of the blennies. The experiment was terminated after 
20 bites or after10 minutes if the fish did not feed any more. The experiment consisted 
of 2 rounds. In the second round the positions of the two plates were reversed. 
 
 
Experiment 2:  
Choice of target in a setup without punishment. Targets in alternating positions 
and out of sight between trials. 
We presented two similar looking plates in alternating positions that were removed 
after each bite. The feeding round was terminated after maximally 20 bites or after10 
minutes if the fish did not feed any more. There was only one round per feeding 
session. 
 
Experiment 3:  
Effects of location and behaviour in a randomized setup including punishment. 
Each blenny was offered three plates in total. Two plates looked very similar to each 
other and the other one showed a different colour and pattern. All plates reacted in 
tow ways to attacks and showed each reaction with a probability of 50 %. They could 
perform a standardized movement toward the blenny (“chasing/punishment”) or they 
could be removed from the tank after being attacked (“fleeing”). The three plates were 
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presented pair–wise in all three possible combinations in a counterbalanced way 
across trials and blennies.  
 
Blennies experienced two sessions per day. In each session, we tried to obtain 18 data 
points but this was rarely possible because the blennies often stopped foraging before 
the completion of a session. We stopped experiments after a maximum of 328 bites 
(243, 248, 328). 
For the analyses we tested in each of the blennies: 
1. if there was a general side preference. For this we tested if the observed choice 
of side differed from the expected 50 % chance value.  
2. if there was a preference for one of the three plates. We tested if the observed 
choice differed from the expected value. We calculated the expected value by 
multiplying the total number of observed bites by the percentage of the 
presence of the given plate. Ideally this would be 33.33 % for all the 3 plates, 
but because the blennies often stopped feeding or refused to bite, the actual 
values varied between 32.1 % and 35.4 %.  
3. if the chasing movement (punishment) led the blennies to switch to the other 
side for the next bite. To test this we compared the percentage of switching 
with and without punishment. 
4. if the chasing movement (punishment) led the blennies to stop biting of the 
plates altogether. To test this we compared the percentage of refusals to bite 
with and without punishment. 
5. if the chasing movement (punishment) influenced the choice of plate at the 
next bite. For this we compared the choices of plates with and without 
punishment. 
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For the laboratory experiments X² tests were performed using the free internet service 
of Preacher (2001). For the analysis of field data we used SPSS 17. For the sign tests 
we used the table of Darlington (2008) provided by the Psychology department of 
Cornell University.  
 
Results 
A) Field 
Choice of victims 
The percentage of anthias attacked varied significantly between individuals, i.e. 
between 10 % and 83 % (approached and bitten) or 9 % and 85 % (only bitten) 
respectively (X² test, n = 20 individuals, approached and bitten: N interactions: 3248, 
X² = 503.404, p < 0.001, only bitten: N interactions: 2173, X² = 392.844, p < 0.001, 
fig. 2). The two different ways of measuring the choice of victims did not provide 
different results. 
 
Reaction to punishment/effect of punishment 
Six blennies were observed being punished more than 50 times by anthias and hence 
analysed in more detail (see methods). The probability of a blenny switching to 
another species after being punished varied between 14.1 % – 71.4 %, yielding overall 
highly significant differences between individuals (X² test, n = 560 observations on 6 
blennies, X² = 227.82, df = 5, p < 0.001, fig. 2). 
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Figure 2: Specialisation on anthias 
The proportion of scalefin anthias, Pseudanthias squamipinnis, in all the attacks of 20 
different blennies observed in the field. Black: Percentage of anthias bitten. White: percentage 
of anthias approached or bitten 
 
The effect of punishment (switching to another species following punishment – 
switching without punishment) was not correlated to the probability of aggressive 
reactions (punishment) of anthias (percentage of aggressive reactions of all reactions) 
though the correlation coefficient was quite positive (Spearman correlation, N = 6 
correlation coefficient = 0.714, p = 0.111). The percentage of aggression was high in  
all observed groups of anthias, (> 66 %). 
 
The relative effect of punishment on switching to a different victim species for the 
next attack was negatively correlated to the probability of switching without 
punishment (Spearman correlation, Correlation Coefficient = – 0.941, p = 0.005). In 
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other words, the positive effect of punishment was strongest if blennies were 
generally unlikely to switch to another victim species (blennies 2, 3 and 4 in figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 
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Figure 3: The effect of punishment 
Black: the probability of six blennies switching to another species following aggression by a 
female anthias. White: the percentage of switching to another species without previous 
aggression. Data shown for the six blennies that were observed being aggressed by female 
scalefin anthias more than 50 times. 
 
 
B) Laboratory 
Experiment 1: Do blennies focus on a location or on a particular victim in the 
absence of punishment (plate remains in the same spot and in sight between 
trials)?  
Combining the data of the two sessions, 3 blennies (3, 4 and 5) showed a significant 
side preference (Sign tests: all n > 24, all p ≤ 0.02), while blenny 1 showed a tendency 
to prefer one side (Sign test: n = 24, p = 0.06). 5 blennies (2, 4, 5, 6 and 7) showed a 
significant preference for one of the two plates (Sign tests: all n > 24, all p ≤ 0.04, fig. 
 105 
4) while blenny 8 showed a tendency to prefer one plate (Sign test: n = 29,  
p = 0.06).  
 
Figure 4 
Figure. 4 Choices of side in the first experiment 
 
black: left side chosen, white: right side chosen. 
A similar, asymmetric distribution of black and white indicates a side preference;  
a dissimilar, asymmetric distribution of black and white indicates a plate preference;  
a similar, symmetric distribution of black and white indicates random choice. 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 2: Do blennies focus on a location or on a particular victim in the 
absence of punishment (plate moves and is out of sight between trials)? 
Plates differed in colour and pattern from experiment 1. Only blenny 3 developed a 
side preference (Sign test: n = 12, p = 0.038, fig. 5). Four blennies (4, 5, 6 and 7) 
developed a preference for one of the two plates (Sign tests: all n > 18, all p ≤ 0.002, 
fig. 5). Note that the five individuals with significant preferences (3, 4, 5, 6 and 7) 
kept their preferences from experiment 1 under the new conditions. Three blennies 
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yielded non significant results, where two of them (blennies 1 and 2) showed a 
tendency to prefer one plate (Sign test: n1 = 8, p1 = 0.07, n2 = 18, p2 = 0.09, fig. 5).  
 
Figure 5  
 
Figure 5: Choice of side and plate in experiment 2 
First column:  
Grey: side chosen more often; white: side chosen less often 
Second column:  
Black: plate chosen more often; white: plate chosen less often 
 
Experiment 3: Does punishment influence the likelihood of attacking and the 
choice of target and location? 
Spontaneous preferences 
All three blennies developed a clear side preference (X² tests, all X² > 16, all  
p < 0.001). In addition, all blennies showed a significant preference for specific plates. 
However, which plate was preferred actually differed between them: One blenny 
preferred the two look–alike plates over the differently looking plate, one blenny 
preferred one of the look–alike plates over the other two plates, and the third blenny 
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preferred the different looking plate over the two look–alike plates (X² tests, all X² > 9, 
all p < 0.01). 
 
Influence of punishment:  
Likelihood of attack  
Two of the blennies were significantly more likely to stop biting after being punished, 
one blenny showed a tendency in the same direction (X² test, p1 = 0.0035, p2 = 0.036, 
p3 = 0.091).  
 
Choice of target 
Punishment influenced the choice of the plate in two of the blennies. One was 
significantly less likely to bite the same plate after being punished and another 
showed a tendency in the same direction (X² tests, X²1 = 3.9, p1 = 0.05, X²2 = 3.05,  
p2 = 0.081). The latter was also significantly more likely to switch from a look–alike 
plate to the different looking plate after being punished (X² test, X² = 9.66, p = 0.002). 
The switching from the differently looking plate to one of the look–alikes was in none 
of the three blennies influenced by punishment (X² tests, all X² < 1.4, all p > 0.2). 
 
Choice of location 
Punishment did not make it more likely that the blennies switched to the other side for 
the next attack (X² tests, all p > 0.2). 
 
Discussion 
In previous studies on parasitic blenny–victim interactions we had found evidence for 
a public good that is maintained through blenny–foraging decisions in two ways 
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(Bshary & Bshary 2010 a, b). First, the punishment of the parasite is stable because it 
is self–serving: blennies avoid punishing individuals. Second, a public good emerges 
because the parasites also are more likely to avoid the whole group after being 
punished. Individual differences in the foraging decisions of blennies could change 
the effect of punishment in a way that makes punishment useless and/or does not 
create a public good. Therefore we were interested if there is variation in blenny 
feeding preferences that could affect both the self–serving aspect of punishment of the 
parasite and the emergence of a public good in shoals of fish. We found variation in 
the behaviour of individual blennies both in the field as well as in the laboratory. 
Moreover, the first two laboratory experiments indicate that individuals are rather 
consistent with respect to a key initial decision: to focus on a suitable location or to 
focus on suitable victims. We will first discuss the potential causes of this variation 
and then discuss the consequences of such variation for the establishment of public 
goods through self–serving punishment. 
 
Potential causes for individual differences between blennies 
Local victim species composition  
One possibility could be that small–scale ecological differences between the 
territories of the parasites, like differences in the local victim composition, lead to 
different hunting strategies. But even at the reef blocks we observed that all show a 
high abundance of anthias the percentage of anthias bitten by blennies varied greatly. 
Abundance alone seems not to be enough to explain the observed differences. 
Different victim species react differently to attacks of blennies. The largest 
differences exist between species that are resident in the territory of the blenny and 
species that occupy larger territories and are only shortly visiting the territory of the 
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blennies. Generally, visiting species do not chase the parasites after attacks while 
resident species regularly show this punishing behaviour (Bshary and Bshary 2010a). 
Blennies that occupy territories that are frequently visited by non–punishing fish 
might preferably bite these victims. But this still has to be confirmed and does not 
explain the whole range of differences between individual blennies. Other differences 
between victim species like differences in mobility or size could also lead to 
preferences in the blennies in dependence of local species composition.  
 
Specialisation on few victim species  
Generally, predators seem to prefer abundant prey types (Murdoch et al 1975, Cook & 
Miller 1977) and the abundance of a given species varies between the territories 
observed. In the field we observed that some blennies specialized on only few victim 
species and were not very likely to switch to other species. Such specialisation has 
been described for many predators and also pollinators (Hoppe–Dominique 1984, 
Waser 1986, Chittka et al 1999, Rana et al. 2002, Bolnick et al. 2003). Feeding 
efficiency may be improved because the predators can focus on one search image at a 
time though they may switch between several search images (Dukas & Kamil 2001). 
It is possible that the different specialisations found in our study species are based on 
individual learning. Blennies could learn which victim species to attack to optimize 
the energy gain (Waser 1986, Hamblin & Giraldeau 2009; Isii & Shimada 2009, 
Schindler et al. 1997). This would be comparable to optimal foraging rules observed 
in other predators and pollinators (Krebs et al. 1978, Ollason 1980, Waser 1986). 
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Specialisation on location  
In the laboratory we observed that some blennies show a strong preference for the 
location of attacks. At reef patches where victims show a high probability of 
aggressive reactions blennies might prefer to attack close to their hiding place to be 
able to quickly retreat into safety.  
 
Some of the observed differences between blennies could also be due to cognitive 
limitations due to the costs of learning. For the blennies it may not be optimal to aim 
at a perfect knowledge of the system they live in. Instead of trying to get a complete 
understanding of the reactions of all individual fish in their territory they therefore 
might rely on simple rules of thumb like: “after being chased avoid this area for the 
next attack” or “if you could get a bite without being aggressed keep the victim in 
view for a possible additional bite”. Such rules of thumb could vary between blennies 
due to differences in victim species composition and other differences between the 
territories. In a complex environment, simple rules may maximise the balance 
between benefits of performing well and the costs of information while individuals 
forego the possibility to achieve maximal rewards in each specific situation (“bounded 
rationality”, Gigerenzer & Selten 2002). 
 
Personality traits  
Much of the literature about individual differences is about personality traits (Sih et al. 
2004a, b, Bergmüller et al. 2010). It is possible that some differences in blenny 
decision rules might be due to differences in personalities. For example, bold 
individuals may be less flexible and hence rather unresponsive to victim behaviour 
while shy individuals incorporate environmental feedback more readily in their 
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foraging decisions. As we did not score any personality traits in our blennies yet we 
won’t discuss this possibility any further. 
 
Consequences of blenny foraging decisions for the evolution of punishment and 
the emergence of public goods 
The victim species we studied in detail, Pseudanthias squamipinnis, seems to be 
rather inflexible in its response to blenny–attacks. Apart from the slightly negative 
correlation between local abundance and probability of punishment we found in our 
previous study (Bshary & Bshary 2010a), there is apparently not much variation in the 
probability of aggressive responses, which was always above 60 %. Thus, we can 
focus on the question how variation in blenny strategies may affect a) the self–serving 
effect of punishment, and b) the emergence of public goods as a side effect. 
 
There are three main scenarios illustrating the importance of variation in blenny 
feeding strategies: 
a) In locations where the blenny is very likely to switch anyway between species no 
matter if it was punished before or not, punishment is not functional. If switching was 
the blennies’ standard strategy, then individual victims would be under selection not 
to punish. There would be no public good but also no competition between look–
alikes because the behaviour of the blenny is not influenced by the behaviour of the 
victims. 
b) If the blenny switches to another individual if punished but not to another species 
then punishment pays for the individual. But this blenny strategy will lead to 
competition between look–alikes rather than to a public good, because for 
conspecifics punishment increases rather than decreases the risk of being attacked.  
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c) Only if punishment causes the blenny to switch to another species does punishment 
pay for the individual while providing a public good by decreasing the risk of future  
attacks for both the individual and its conspecifics. 
 
Here we make some predictions how variation in a blenny’s preference for certain 
locations and a focus on individual recognition and book–keeping of victim responses 
may lead to punishment being self–serving or not, and providing a public good or not. 
These predictions are amenable for future testing. First, blennies with a strong 
preference for a location are highly likely to cause repeated interactions within short 
time periods. This is the situation where punishment may be effective if the victim 
lives in the core area. Outside the core area interactions will be infrequent and 
punishment won’t pay because the blenny is very likely to switch to another victim 
anyway. Alternatively, a blenny roves within its territory and hence is likely to switch 
automatically between victims because of the roving. In such circumstances 
punishment does not provide benefits to the punisher.  
Second, blennies that mainly pay attention to individual identity select for punishment 
but such punishment could cause either increased competition or a public good. An 
increase in competition would be more likely if the blennies remember an experience 
with a specific individual rather than with a species. If blennies mainly avoid location 
in response to punishment then they may shift microhabitat, which should increase the 
likelihood that they switch to another species, and hence punishment would pay for 
the individual and create a public good. The predictions are summarised in Table 1. 
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 Aspects of blenny foraging rules 
 Roving Preference for 
location/species 
Preference for non-
punishing individuals 
Blenny 
reaction to 
punishment: 
none; switches 
anyway between 
individual/species 
switches to another 
individual/species 
switches to another 
individual/species 
Punishment 
provides: 
no benefit benefit for 
individual 
benefit for  
individual 
Without 
punishment 
no difference blenny is likely  
to return to same 
location 
blenny is likely  
to return to same 
individual 
Effect of 
punishment on 
conspecifics 
no effect decreases risk increases risk 
Public good no public good public good no public good 
 
Table 1: predictions how aspects of blenny foraging rules affect the efficiency of punishment 
and the emergence of a public good in shoaling victim species with a spatial structure. 
 
On the stability of punishment and public goods 
Our field observations and laboratory experiments demonstrate that individual 
blennies are indeed variable with respect to the importance of location and victim 
identity for their foraging decisions. Thus, the major open question at this stage is 
whether the observed variation in blenny decision rules, which sometimes renders 
punishment ineffective or merely self–serving, and which may affect look–alikes in 
either positive or negative ways, overall helps to stabilise the emergence of a public 
good due to self–serving punishment (Bshary & Bshary 2010b). Several models of 
cooperation yield stable cooperation because variation is maintained by ontogenetic 
effects (‘phenotypic defectors’ in Sherratt & Roberts 2001) or mutation rates 
(McNamara et al. 2004). Thus, the observed variation may indeed help to stabilise 
contributions to the public good in our system. On the other hand, one has to explain 
why anthias seem to be rather inflexible in their decision rules and always show high 
levels of aggressive responses. At this stage we cannot exclude that there is variation 
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between individuals but the observations suggest that individuals confronted with a 
blenny that switches anyway are on average as aggressive as individuals that face a 
blenny specialising on anthias. A game theoretic exploration of the observations may 
help to generate more specific predictions amenable for future testing. 
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General Discussion 
 
The aim of this thesis was to study in detail the interactions between parasitic sabre–
tooth blennies and their victim reef fishes. The perspective was to gain understanding 
of a system in which both punishment and public goods may exist, and which can be 
studied both in nature and with an experimental setup in the laboratory. Overall, I was 
lucky enough to be able to answer some of the questions I intended to address. In this 
general discussion, I will first summarise the key results of the three data chapters in 
order to discuss what we have learned about the blenny–host system. I will then 
propose several ideas for future research. While not developed in detail in this thesis, I 
had tried to answer several additional questions during my PhD, and I will introduce 
preliminary results and the methodological problems I encountered as inspiration and 
help for future students working on the system. Finally, I will discuss what we may 
have learned more generally about punishment and contributions to public goods. 
 
Discussion of all papers combined 
The three manuscripts build naturally upon each other. The first paper contains the 
basic field observations on blenny–host interactions with the aim of describing the 
system and generating predictions amenable for future testing. The second paper 
explicitly tests hypotheses about punishment and emerging public goods, while the 
third paper documents individual variation in behaviour and decision rules of the 
blennies. 
 
The key results of the field observations were first that not all fish respond in the same 
way to blenny attacks. Only resident species that share their territory with a blenny 
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and repeatedly interact with the same parasite react aggressively to its attacks, while 
visiting species use their potential to escape further interactions by swimming off. 
Second, we found that the probability of aggressive reactions to blenny attacks is 
negatively correlated to group size, but even in large groups of victim species the 
aggressive chasing does not disappear. The first result matches observations on the 
cleaner wrasse – client mutualism, where the same resident clients but not visiting 
clients respond to occasional cheating by cleaners with chasing, for which it was 
demonstrated that it functions as punishment (Bshary & Grutter 2002; 2005). Visiting 
clients swam off in response to cleaner cheating and avoided the cleaning station in 
the future (Bshary & Schäffer 2002). It seemed likely that the function of the observed 
behaviours is the same in reef fish – blenny interactions. For punishment to be 
effective repeated interactions are important (Clutton–Brock & Parker 1995). This 
could explain the difference between resident and visiting species: as resident species 
do not have the option to avoid repeated interactions with the parasite, it could be 
beneficial for them to invest in punishment. Visiting victim species, on the other hand, 
could in principle avoid close proximity to a blenny by staying away from its reef 
patch. Thus, they are most likely to meet the very same blenny again once they have 
forgotten the negative experience and hence revisit the patch. In any case, time 
intervals between subsequent close encounters with a blenny will be much longer for 
visitors than for residents, which should undermine the ability of both visitors and 
blenny to remember the last interaction. Thus, the benefits of punishment are unlikely 
to apply to visitor–blenny interactions due to cognitive constraints. Along this line of 
argument, Oates et al. (2010 a, b) found that roving cleaner wrasses Labroides bicolor 
cheated clients more frequently than L. dimidiatus individuals did, and proposed that 
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prolonged time intervals between successive interactions played a key role for this 
difference.  
 
The result that chasing was negatively correlated to group size suggested that the 
benefits of chasing decrease with increasing group size. There were two possible 
explanations for this: a) in large groups there are fewer interactions between an 
individual fish and the parasite and therefore the individual incentive to chase 
decreases with group size. b) the effect of the chasing is that the parasite switches to 
another victim species. This would create a public good in large shoals of look–alikes. 
In this case the benefit gets diluted because all members gain from the chasing while 
the costs stay the same for a chasing individual. As aggressive chasing did not stop 
completely in large groups the results suggested that there is no classic “tragedy of the 
commons” involved in this system. On the other hand it seemed unlikely that the most 
promoted explanations for stable contributions to public goods in humans, namely 
‘altruistic punishment’ stabilised by strong between–group competition (Fehr & 
Gächter 2002; Boyd et al. 2003; Gintis et al. 2003) or reputation (Nowak & Sigmund 
1998; Milinski et al. 2002). In particular altruistic punishment seemed unlikely 
because of the lack of kin structure (Avise & Shapiro 1986).  
 
Nevertheless, as the aggression by victims towards blennies suggested the existence 
of punishment in the system, we had to consider ways in which individuals gain direct 
fitness benefits from chasing blennies. At some point during my thesis, Sherratt et al 
(2009) provided a potentially fitting explanation. The authors tried to understand why 
bacteria produce and release a variety of substances like enzymes into their 
environment, which benefits neighbouring bacteria as well (West et al. 2007). Sherratt 
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et al. (2009) found that contributions to a public good can be self–serving as long as 
each individual benefits disproportionately from its own contribution. This condition 
fits the bacteria examples as due to limited diffusion each individual gains most from 
its own contributions while cells that are far away will not gain anything. In the 
blenny–host system two non–exclusive mechanisms could lead to individuals 
benefiting disproportionately from their own punishment of blennies. First, if shoals 
have a spatial structure and hence individuals have preferred locations punishment 
may benefit the actor if the blenny subsequently avoids the location where it was 
chased. Second, if blennies have the ability to recognize individual victims then 
aggression may lead to the blennies avoiding punishing individuals. Both scenarios 
seemed to be possible in the blenny–host system. Individual recognition has been 
demonstrated repeatedly in fishes, including recognition of members of other species 
(Griffiths & Ward 2006, Tebbich et al. 2002). The issue of spatial structures within 
shoals was mainly addressed within the framework of a Master thesis by Gabriel 
Cisarovsky, who documented that at least female scalefin anthias have indeed a 
spatial structure in their shoals (Cisarovsky et al., unpublished manuscript).  
 
The most urgent open questions from the first manuscript that I addressed in the 
second manuscript were to test whether aggression functions as punishment, whether 
punishment creates a public good in locally abundant species, and what factors cause 
the aggression by victims to be self–serving. To test if the chasing of the parasite acts 
as punishment we performed experiments in the laboratory to be able to control the 
behaviour of the “victims” using Plexiglas plates as substitutes for real victims. If the 
blennies were allowed to choose between a plate that always chases and another that 
always “flees” they showed a significant preference for the fleeing plate and avoided 
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the chaser. This showed that the investment of chasing the parasite changes its 
behaviour in a way that benefits the chasing individual in future interactions. The 
chasing observed in victims of parasitic blennies completely fulfils the definition of 
“punishment” provided in Clutton–Brock & Parker (1995). Until now there are only 
few examples of punishment in non–human animals that not only show that 
individuals inflict costs on individuals that harm them but also that the punished 
individuals change their behaviour in future interactions in a way that is beneficial to 
the punisher (Bshary & Grutter 2005, Bshary et al. 2008, Raihani et al. 2010). 
 
Field observations focussing on female anthias documented that punishment can 
create a public good in large groups of fish. In this species individual punishment 
makes it more likely that the blenny switches to another species for its next attack. 
Hence all members of a shoal of anthias benefit from the chasing done by one 
member of the group while only the punishing individual has to bear the costs. While 
the results resembled very much a solution to the tragedy of the commons we also 
tested Sherratt et al.’s (2009) prediction that individuals gain disproportionately from 
their own contribution. Unfortunately we could not collect enough field data to 
analyse whether punishing fish face a reduced risk of future attacks in comparison to 
non–punishing individuals. In any case such data would have been only correlational, 
while we could test the hypothesis explicitly in the laboratory. To test how the 
blennies react to a mix of punishing individuals and free–riders in a group of look–
alikes we performed an experiment using three Plexiglas plates, two of which looked 
alike but differed with respect to the probability of punishing the blennies. The 
differently looking plate punished with intermediate probability. Under these 
conditions the blennies generally preferred the non–punishing plate over the 
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punishing plate. Our studies in the laboratory suggest that blennies avoid punishing 
individuals and that these can profit from the chasing while non–punishing individuals 
are at risk to be identified as easy targets. Free–riding under these conditions is 
therefore no option, because the blennies’ foraging strategies select against it. This is 
in accordance with our observations in the field that the chasing persists even in large 
groups of fish. In conclusion, punishment turned out to be self–serving while 
providing a public good as a by–product. The benefits of punishment are not so much 
due to the punisher gaining disproportionate benefits but to the free–rider facing 
disproportionate costs due to blenny foraging decision rules.  
 
The results from the second manuscript made it clear that we should study the 
foraging decision rules of blennies in more detail in a third data manuscript. Do 
blennies specialize on one or several victim species or are they fully opportunistic? 
How important are spatial and individual victim cues for their decision to attack? Is 
there variation between individuals with respect to the importance of these variables? 
We had actually already noticed (without exploring them in detail) in the field data 
presented in Bshary & Bshary (2010b) that there were individual differences in the 
foraging decisions of the blennies. The laboratory experiments demonstrated that the 
blennies generally prefer to attack abundant species. Given that many variables may 
affect blenny foraging decisions and lead to individual differences between blennies, 
how would such variation affect the effectiveness of punishment and the emergence 
of public goods?  
 
A detailed re–analysis of the field observation revealed indeed strong variation 
between individual blennies with respect to the foraging decision rules. Some would 
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switch with high probability between victim species regardless of victim responses 
while others focussed on anthias as victim species and would only switch victim 
species if punished. The laboratory experiments demonstrated that some blennies have 
preferred locations for their attacks while others focus on preferred individuals. 
Punishment affects most blennies but not all respond in a way that benefits the 
punishing individual. All this variation implies that while punishment is on average 
effective and public goods may typically arise in locally abundant species, the precise 
outcome will vary from blenny to blenny. How the variation in blenny decision rules 
may evolve and how victims should evolve their optimal responses in return has to be 
addressed in proper evolutionary game theoretic modelling and is indeed underway 
(Sherratt et al. unpublished model). Finally, it is important to note that the variation 
we documented may be novel within the particular context and the detail 
(‘responsiveness to punishment’) but it fits the conclusions from a variety of other 
studies that found that individual predators and individual parasites may develop 
prey/host specialisations during their ontogeny (Hoppedominik 1984, Bolnick 2003, 
Schindler 1997). 
 
In summary, we found a) that victim species that cannot escape from frequent 
exposure to sabre–tooth blenny attacks behave aggressively towards the blennies, b) 
that aggression serves as punishment, c) that punishment may provide a public good 
in locally abundant species, d) that free–riding is not a good option because blennies 
prefer to attack free–riders (non–punishers), and e) that individual blennies differ 
strongly in their foraging decision rules, which may affect both the efficiency of 
punishment and the emergence of public goods. 
 
 128 
Open questions 
While I was lucky enough to be able to answer some of the key questions I had 
initially hoped to address during my thesis, there are several remaining questions, and 
inevitably new ones emerged based on the results I obtained. There is thus still a lot of 
research to be done on blenny–host interactions. The following part may help to 
inspire specific research projects, without any particular order of relevance or 
feasibility. 
 
Function of and differences between the different types of aggressive chasing 
In our observations in the reef we noticed that the victims of blennies not only react to 
attacks but also show aggressive chasing when they are approached by the parasite in 
a biting attempt (the blenny approaches from behind in a typical stop and go manner) 
and sometimes without obvious reasons (pre–emptive). Most strikingly, aggression in 
the three circumstances – after being bitten, in response to approach and 
spontaneously – were not all significantly correlated with each other. This lack of 
correlation suggests different functions but what these are remains unclear. In all three 
circumstances a deterrent effect on the blenny seems to be plausible. But we noticed 
that in response to an approach by a blenny it was generally enough for the 
prospective victim to turn into the direction of the parasite to stop the attack. So why 
do some individuals invest into aggressive chasing under these circumstances?  
 
Laboratory observations on anthias–blenny interactions suggest that ‘spontaneous 
aggression’ may not be spontaneous after all. Originally aimed at studying individual 
variation in punishment and the effects of group size on the probability of punishment, 
the blennies hardly ever attacked unless the anthias were fed. But while they were fed 
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the anthias rarely responded aggressively to bites. However, we noticed that 
individual anthias that had been bitten during feeding sessions were more likely to 
chase the blennies ‘spontaneously’ during the five minutes following the feeding 
session than individuals that had not been bitten (A. Bshary, unpublished data). 
Maybe the ‘spontaneous aggression’ we observed in the reef is something similar, but 
this has to be tested. What the laboratory data show is that anthias hold grudges: while 
they typically respond to an immediate attack failure to do so increases chances to 
chase the parasite later on. Furthermore, it is possible that there is general variation 
between individuals with respect to their aggressiveness, and that aggressiveness in 
intra– and inter–specific contexts correlate with each other. We found in our 
laboratory studies on anthias that intra–and inter–specific (against blennies) 
aggression were positively correlated in all five study tanks (A. Bshary, unpublished 
data). We also tried to measure hormonal concentrations of Testosterone and 11–K 
Testosterone in our study animals but the samples appeared to be contaminated as the 
controls yielded similar values as the experimental samples. Despite the failure with 
the hormonal analyses, the results indicate that proximate causes may partly help to 
explain aggression/punishment in our system. Nevertheless, holding grudges may be 
functional if the delayed chasing alters the blenny’s perception of its victim from 
‘free–rider’ to ‘punisher’ and hence decreases the risk of future attacks. 
 
Is there individual variation in aggressive responses of victims to blenny attacks? 
We observed differences in the level of aggressive responses on species level. Until 
now it is not completely clear if the observed differences are due to a mix of (mainly) 
punishing and (mainly) non–punishing individuals or due to strong variability in the 
response of single individuals. It is possible that the probability of aggressive 
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reactions is condition dependent and individual fish only invest into punishment if 
they can afford to do so at any given moment. This would lead to variability in every 
given individual (intra–individual differences). It is also possible that there are 
individual fish that are more aggressive than others and therefore always more likely 
to react aggressively to attacks by blennies, as suggested by the positive correlation 
between intra– and inter–specific aggression in male anthias observed in the 
laboratory. While the correlation does not demonstrate individual differences there is 
plenty of evidence in the animal personality literature that animals differ with respect 
to aggressiveness (Sih et al. 2004, Bergmüller et al. 2010). Larger sample sizes in the 
laboratory where all fish can be individually marked would allow answering several 
of the questions raised in the current and in the previous section. These data should be 
complemented by field observations. Below are some specific methodological 
suggestions for such experiments and field observations based on my largely failed 
attempts. 
 
Laboratory experiment considerations 
For the blennies I would chose Plagiotremus rhinorhynchus, because it seems to be 
easier to catch then P. tapeinosoma and we know how to keep this species under 
laboratory conditions (Bshary &Bshary 2010b). As victim species I would chose 
again the species Pseudanthias squamipinnis. They are a common species in the Red 
Sea, easy to catch and frequently attacked by the two blenny species. We also know 
already how to keep them under laboratory conditions. As they are rather susceptible 
to infections under laboratory conditions they should be bathed in a Praziquantel 
solution (an anthelmintic effective against different parasites) before they are released 
into the tanks.  
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The number of individuals should not be too small because anthias are shoaling fish 
and do not behave naturally in small numbers. I would consider 20 individuals the 
minimum. The tanks have to include shelters for every individual anthias (plastic 
tubes, bricks) and a tube (plastic or bamboo, see figure 1 and 2) as hiding place for the 
blenny. The anthias need additional structures surrounding the shelters to behave 
normally (figure 1). Anthias are plankton feeders and normally feed in front or above 
the reef structures where they have their hiding places. The tanks have to be high 
enough to allow the anthias to move in a natural way. If they are too shallow the 
anthias stay most of the time in their hiding places and do not show much activity 
except during feeding sessions and the parasitic blennies will not interact normally 
with the anthias. The diameter of the tanks should be large enough to allow for 
enough space between the shelters of the anthias to reduce intra–specific aggression. 
The tanks we used in my experiments had a diameter of 1m which was just enough to 
fit 20 shelters inside (figure 1). Larger tanks may be preferable in future experiments. 
 
 
Figure 1  
Experimental setup at Lizard Island research station, 2004; left tanks; right structures and 
hiding places, anthias males (violet) and females (orange) and blenny. 
 
A major challenge will be to create conditions in which blennies will produce natural 
foraging behaviour, which would mean about 20 bites per hour. I predict that a high 
water column will make them behave more active. Strong influx and outlet could 
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produce a current in the tank which may promote attacks as well. A key feature of a 
successful setup will be continuous provisioning of small amounts of food, mimicking 
plankton floating by in nature. Distracted individuals are most likely to be bitten by 
blennies but our previous experiments showed that if feeding is restricted to few 
sessions per day the victims will focus on foraging and will not respond immediately 
to bites by the blenny. 
Figure 2 
 
Female P. squamipinnis, tagged beneath the 
dorsal fin. 
 
P. rhinorhynchus in its hiding place in the 
laboratory. 
 
Field observation considerations 
For some of my questions observing anthias in the field yielded good quality data sets. 
Additional data sets will rely on the ability to observe repeated interactions between 
blennies and marked individuals. The blennies could be of either species, while 
anthias still appear to be the most appropriate victim species as they are abundant, 
frequently in the open water column and regularly attacked by blennies. Nevertheless, 
the problem with these data is that we did not manage to get them yet despite repeated 
attempts. In the field there are too many potential victims on a patch (typically 60–
150) so that they cannot be all individually marked: the method is to inject coloured 
elastomer (VIE, visible implant elastomer tag provided by NMT) into scale pouches 
(see figure 2). Two easily visible colours (blue and white/yellow) and six different 
locations help rapid identification of up to 24 individuals. In addition to this reduced 
data set there are on average few interactions per individual and day. Cisarovsky 
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(unpublished manuscript) estimated that there is about 1 interaction per individual 
anthias per 12 hour day. This implies that a person who would dive four hours per day 
would have to spend two month at one reef patch in order get on average 20 
interactions per marked individual. Therefore, the laboratory setup seems to offer 
more promising conditions.  
 
Is punishment of cleaners and blennies something that co–evolved? 
As the same species that punish blennies also punish cleaners for cheating it appears 
to be possible that the behaviour in the two situations did co–evolve or that evolution 
in one context promoted the use in the other one. Maybe punishment evolved in the 
cleaner – client context and is a reaction to “cheating” by cleaners that led to the same 
reaction to “cheating” in another context. A possibility to test this hypothesis would 
be to look at how fish in the Caribbean that coevolved with cleaning gobies instead of 
cleaning wrasses react to blennies. These clients do not punish the gobies (Soares et al. 
2008), which seems to be understandable because cleaning gobies prefer ectoparasites 
over client mucus and hence prefer to cooperate (Soares et al. 2010). In the Caribbean 
there are no biting blennies present, so they are not adapted to interact with the 
parasites. But it would be possible to let them interact with cleaner wrasses that 
occasionally cheat and test their behaviour after being bitten by a cleaner. If 
Caribbean resident fish that are for some time confronted with cleaner wrasses in the 
laboratory show aggressive chasing of the biting cleaners even though they do not do 
this to cleaning gobies then this inter–specific aggression is present in their 
behavioural repertoire and they are flexible enough to use it if necessary. In this case 
it is not necessary to evolve punishment in the cleaner context to be able to punish 
blennies. If they do not show any aggressive chasing if they are confronted with biting 
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cleaners then this suggests that the aggression against the two different cheaters may 
be linked in some way.  
 
Is there an additional public good effect of delayed attacks after punishment? 
We observed in our laboratory studies on the effect of punishment on blennies that the 
parasites sometimes refuse to attack the next set of plates if they were punished in the 
previous round (page 98). It would be interesting to see if there is a similar effect 
under natural conditions. If the parasites delay the next attack after being punished 
this could add to the public good that we observed, because ALL other victims in the 
territory of the blenny, not only the punisher and its group members, would benefit 
from a period of repose. It would be rather easy to test this in the field. Until now 
there are no measurements of time intervals between attacks. Using this information it 
would be possible to compare the time intervals between attacks with and without 
previous punishment. The hypothesis would be that after punishment the next attack is 
delayed. This could have several reasons. First, the chasing itself will use up some 
time. Second, the blennies are sometimes hiding in their hiding place if they were 
chased intensely. This could delay the search for a new victim. And third, as observed 
in the laboratory experiments, the punishment itself could deter the blennies for some 
time from attacking. To exclude the two first possibilities it would be necessary to 
ignore the time spent chasing and hiding. 
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Are there personality differences between blennies and are they linked to 
differences in feeding strategies? 
While I documented individual differences in behaviour in my thesis it remains 
unclear what factors cause this variation. Individual experience and operant 
conditioning (successful actions are more likely to be repeated than unsuccessful 
actions) could cause much of the variation we observed. Nevertheless, personality 
differences seem to be widespread in animals (Bergmüller et al. 2010, Sih et al. 2004 
a, b, Gosling & John 1999). It could be interesting to test the blennies for personality 
differences and more importantly to test if these differences, if there are any, are 
linked to some of the observed differences in feeding strategies. One could imagine 
that individuals that are risk averse might stay closer to their hiding place and avoid 
predatory species as well as highly mobile species. Those individuals might also 
respond more strongly to being chased by their victims. Personality therefore could 
lead to differences in victim species composition as well as to differences in the 
effectiveness of punishment in this system. There are standard tests for individual 
differences in boldness and aggressiveness (Wechsler 1995, Gosling 2001, Reale et al. 
2007) like the “novel object” test that compares individual differences in factors like 
the time delay to approach a novel object. These tests could be combined with the 
kind of experiments conducted in my thesis. 
 
Is there a preference for visiting species? 
The field observations allowed us to document a major difference between resident 
victim species and victim species that are only visiting the territories of blennies: 
visiting species nearly never react aggressively to blenny attacks but rather swim off 
to avoid future attacks. When we observed the blennies in the field it looked like the 
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parasites started to attack visiting species as soon as they arrived. Until now there is 
no data that allows us to test if blennies exploit this difference and prefer to attack 
visiting species over resident species. To test this we would need quantitative data 
about resident and visiting species present at any given time. Because the numbers for 
resident species are constant over time it would only be necessary to keep track of 
visitors that are entering and leaving the territory. It would also be interesting if there 
is a difference between blennies in territories that are regularly visited and in 
territories that are only rarely visited. This could give us an idea about how beneficial 
– or costly – it is to “specialize” on “easy prey” like visiting species. 
 
Do blennies that experience a more complex victim composition have different 
feeding strategies than blennies with a simpler victim composition? 
One possible explanation for the different feeding strategies observed could be small 
scale differences in victim composition and in its complexity. In the cleaner – client 
context it could be shown that cleaners that live in a more complex environment (on 
the continuous reef) including more client species perform better in learning tasks 
than cleaners that live at small reef blocks that are less complex in respect to client 
composition (Sharon Wismer unpublished Master thesis). This suggests that for 
cleaners in a simpler environment it is enough to use some “rules of thumb” to be able 
to interact with all clients while cleaner in a more complex environment have to stay 
flexible and to be able to learn more fine–tuned behavioural rules. Though it is not 
clear if the interactions of blennies and their victims are complex enough to produce a 
similar pattern it is still possible that the complexity of victim composition has an 
important effect on the foraging rules of the parasites. At reef blocks with high 
numbers of individuals it might pay to specialize on the most abundant species instead 
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of learning how to interact with all the different species while at some small reef 
patches there might simply not be enough individuals of any one species in total to 
allow for specialization.  
 
The importance of location for blenny attacks 
An important issue for a thorough understanding of the blenny–host system is to 
determine how both parasite and victims use space. Do blennies have preferred 
locations for attack? Do they tend to avoid a location where they have been chased 
recently? Do individual victims of the various victim species use preferential locations 
and could hence benefit from keeping a blenny away from their favourite sites? 
Gabriel Cisarovsky could demonstrate that female anthias shoals indeed have a spatial 
structure (Cisarovsky et al., unpublished manuscript). I tried do answer if the blennies 
indeed avoid a location where they have been chased recently, and more specifically 
if the distance between the parasite and the victims is larger after punishment than 
after no reaction or victim flight. The data were largely inconclusive due to small 
sample sizes in the ‘non–punishment’ condition and a low resolution of the grid 
system we established (1x1x1m cells). Regarding the distance between blennies and 
their victims I observed the blennies and their victims and after each attack I followed 
the victim for 20 seconds (the shortest time interval that allowed the blenny and the 
victim to be “back to normal”) and then estimated with the help of a reference stick a) 
the distance between victim and blenny, b) the distance between victim and location 
of attack, and c) the distance between blenny and location of attack. Because there 
was always only one blenny present this was rather straightforward. For the two 
blennies for which I had enough data to perform statistics there was no difference in 
the distances between aggression/no aggression if I looked at the distance between the 
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victim and the location and between the victim and the blenny. But the distance 
between the blenny and the location of attack was larger following aggression in one 
of the two blocks (Mann–Whitney U test, N = 144, Z = –2.5, p= 0.012). This 
indicated that this blenny might indeed avoid the location of attack rather than the 
aggressive individual. For the other blenny there was no significant effect. It is thus 
interesting to note that we find individual differences in space use decisions in the two 
blennies of this study. 
 
General conclusions 
The starting point of my PhD was to study punishment and public goods. The 
literature on laboratory studies on humans based on simple but rather artificial games 
provided mixed results. Some studies found positive effects of punishment on 
cooperation (Rockenbach & Milinski 2006), others found that punishment can 
stabilize cooperation if it is effective and rather cheap (Egas & Riedl 2008) and others 
found negative effects of punishment (Dreber et al. 2008). Therefore it seemed 
promising to study a system in which punishment occurred under natural conditions to 
evaluate its effects on the potential emergence of a public good. 
 
The most important result of my study on parasitic blennies and their host reef fishes 
is that punishment is not necessarily altruistic if it creates a public good. Moreover, 
the amelioration of a public good does not need to be the goal of the punishing action. 
Instead, a public good may arise as a by–product of self–serving punishment. Stable 
contributions to public goods were not due to any controlling actions between group 
members. Instead, the problem of free–riding was solved by the common enemy: the 
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parasitic blennies would self–servingly ‘punish’ free–riders by focussing their attacks 
on such individuals. 
 
Overall, the study system seemed to fit the assumptions of a volunteer’s dilemma 
better than the assumptions of a classic public goods game. In the latter game group 
gains are proportional to overall contributions while in the former game a contribution 
by few or even just one individual is enough to create the public good (Diekmann 
1985, Archetti 2011). Theoretical analyses of the volunteer’s dilemma focus on how 
individuals should adapt the probability of contributing to factors like group size, the 
number of acting individuals necessary to produce the public good, or relative payoffs 
(Diekmann 1985, Archetti 2011). My study system provides a new solution to the 
general problem: the individual that has been bitten was ‘chosen’ by the parasite to 
make a decision and cannot expect any conspecifics to act instead. These asymmetries 
remove uncertainties over who could/should take action and at the same time cause a 
situation where the acting individual gains a disproportionate benefit compared to 
other group members, which greatly stabilises contributions to public goods (Sherratt 
et al. 2009). 
 
For future studies on humans, I propose that we need more observations on real–life 
interactions that involve punishment and/or public goods. Such observations would 
give first indications whether punishment in humans may also often be primarily self–
serving and whether the emergence of public goods may often be a by–product rather 
than the goal. One hitherto rather unexplored potential individual benefit of punishing 
for the benefit of a public good could be the gain of a reputation. If the reputation of 
being a punisher increases the probability of receiving help in future interactions or if 
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it deters competitors (Johnstone & Bshary 2004) it might be worth to invest into such 
a reputation.  
 
Another important line of future research concerns the potential existence of 
asymmetric benefits, more specifically cases in which individuals benefit 
disproportionately from their own contributions to the public good. Reputation 
provides one mechanism in humans how individuals may benefit disproportionately 
from their own contribution. Spatial structures in which benefits get diluted with 
increasing distance is another way (Sherratt et al 2009), e.g. if humans care about their 
neighbourhood. Asymmetries in strength can be yet another. If stronger individuals 
can get more than the average share of the benefits they might be willing to undertake 
actions that benefit the group as whole. For example, Nunn & Lewis (2001) suggested 
that dominant males may evict floating males from the territory to their own benefit 
but also to the benefit of lower ranking (and hence weaker) male group members that 
remain passive. In humans, an experiment showed that if only one individual has the 
possibility to punish for the whole group this leads to more effective cooperation in a 
public goods game (O’Gorman et al. 2009). Asymmetries may be important for the 
evolution of punishment in general, also outside the public goods context. The best 
example of punishment outside humans involves marine cleaning mutualism (Bshary 
& Grutter 2005). In this mutualism, interactions between cleaner wrasses and resident 
non–predatory clients are asymmetric and it is clear who is always the good (the 
client) and who is potentially the bad who then needs to be punished (the cleaner). 
Maybe such asymmetries that are normally not present in the design of human studies 
are essential for punishment to function. 
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What is still needed are more systems in which public goods could be studied in 
nature. There are some explicit studies on bacteria (West et al. 2007) and on 
cooperatively breeding species (Clutton–Brock et al.2000, 2009, Kingma er al. 2011, 
Bergmüller et al. 2005, Sparkman et al. 2011). Both bacteria and cooperatively 
breeding species have the methodological problem that kin selection may play a role. 
But there may be other examples of public goods that do not necessarily include 
related individuals. It would be worthwhile to think in more detail about shared 
vigilance, cooperative hunting or mobbing that often include several species (Sridar et 
al. 2009, Nolen & Lucas 2009, Stojan–Dolar & Heymann 2010, Bshary et al. 2006). 
In these systems it seems likely that the public goods are typically due to self–serving 
actions of individuals. Hence, established concepts like by–product mutualism 
(Brown 1983), pseudoreciprocity (Connor 1986) and Group augmentation (Kokko et 
al. 2001) may be applied. These concepts may not excite game theoreticians because 
cheating is not an issue because of the self–serving nature of contributions. However, 
it will be interesting to use an ecological approach in order to understand what 
ecological factors promote self–serving behaviours that lead to the emergence of 
public goods. Given that modern humans face major public goods problems like 
overuse of resources, pollution, or global warming, two possible solutions emerge. 
The first is to find ways to convince humans to behave altruistically. The second is to 
use laws and/or financial incentives to create ‘ecological conditions’ under which 
contributions to public goods become self–serving. The latter option appears to 
provide a more realistic way.  
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